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MONITORING A GAME OF WINKS, NODS, AND RISK: 
DERIVATIVES REGULATION IN THE E.U. AND POLAND 
 
Robert F. Schwartz* 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Background 
 
European Union regulators hailed legislative completion of the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) in mid-2004.1 Announced in 
1999, the FSAP covered forty-two measures designed to harmonize 
member states’ approach to financial services and the capital 
markets.2 Spurred by the introduction of the euro, the FSAP 
ultimately aimed to fashion a single financial market with low costs 
of capital, high returns on investment, and abundant sources of 
funding.3 Number one on the FSAP list of priorities for the 
formation of such a market was the formulation of common rules 
for integrated securities and derivatives markets.4  
 
 
* J.D., University of Virginia (2006); Senior Production Editor, Virginia Journal 
of International Law; Brigham Young University International Law & Management 
Review Annual Writing Competition Winner (2005); Fulbright Scholar, Warsaw 
University Faculty of Law and Administration (2002–03); B.A. Philosophy, Brigham 
Young University (2002). The author thanks the following individuals for their 
outstanding insight and patience: Paul G. Mahoney, Brokaw Professor of Corporate 
Law, University of Virginia; Christof Fritzen, Managing Director, Deutsche Bank AG; 
Mike Becker, Associate, Allen & Overy; and Amy Schwartz. All views are the 
author’s own and all translations from Polish are by the author.  
1 See Eur. Comm’n, Internal Mkt., Fin. Serv. Pol’y Group, Tenth Progress 
Report: Turning the Corner, Preparing the Challenge of the Next Phase of European 
Capital Market Integration (June 2, 2004) [hereinafter Tenth Progress Report], 
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index 
/progress10_en.pdf; compare with Eur. Comm’n, Internal Mkt., Fin. Serv. Pol’y 
Group, Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan (May 11, 
1999) [hereinafter FSAP], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/ 
finances/docs/actionplan/index/action_en.pdf (outlining the Commission’s plan for a 
single financial market).  
2 See FSAP, supra note 1. 
3 See id.; see also Niamh Moloney, Time to Take Stock on the Markets: The 
Financial Services Action Plan Concludes as the Company Law Action Plan Rolls 
Out, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 999 (2004).  
4 See FSAP, supra note 1, at 5.  
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The high priority of derivatives regulation under the FSAP was 
not new; initial E.U. efforts to deal with derivatives date to the 
early 1990s.5 In 1995, faced with the spectacle of the Barings 
collapse,6 the European Parliament issued a resolution that 
recognized derivatives’ crucial role in global markets. The 
European Parliament also stressed the need to address through 
legislation challenges generated by explosive growth in derivatives 
use.7 The Resolution requested that the European Commission 
create an agenda to update the Union’s approach to derivatives and 
keep Parliament appraised of all developments.8 As part of its 
ongoing effort to fulfill the Resolution’s assignment, the 
Commission drafted the FSAP.  
Progress under the FSAP has been remarkable. By June 2004, 
lawmakers enacted thirty-nine of forty-two measures, including all 
derivatives-related measures. Although legislative efforts to 
complete the FSAP officially lasted through 2005, regulators in 
Europe turned their attention to FSAP implementation as early as 
2004.9 Full implementation of derivatives-oriented provisions 
 
 
5 See, e.g., Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992, On the Coordination 
of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Direct Insurance 
Other than Life Assurance and Amending Directives 73/239/EEC and 88/357/EEC, 
art. 21(1)(C)(iv), 1992 O.J. (L 228) 1; Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 Mar. 1993, 
The Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and Credit Institutions, arts. 2(10), 4(1)(i), 
4(5), 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27. 
6 With regard to the breakdown of Barings, Rasiah Gengatharen notes:  
 
On 27 February 1995 the British merchant bank, Barings Plc, 
was placed under administration due to massive losses incurred by 
its subsidiary, Barings Futures Singapore (BFS). These losses 
stemmed from the unauthorized trading activities of Nick Leeson, 
the General Manager of BFS, on the Singapore and Osaka Futures 
Exchange.…Leeson was…able to take advantage of the lack of 
internal controls and supervision to conceal his losses from 
unauthorized trading. 
 
RASIAH GENGATHAREN, DERIVATIVES LAW AND REGULATION 30–31 (1st ed. 
2001). 
7 Resolution on Parliament’s Recommendations to the Commission Concerning 
a Legislative Proposal on Financial Derivatives: Their Present Role on Capital 
Markets, Their Advantages and Risks, 1995 O.J. (C 269) 217, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:51995IP0207: 
EN:HTML.  
8 Id. at 219.  
9 See Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Financial Services Action Plan: Good 
Progress but Real Impact Depends on Good Implementation (June 1, 2004), available 
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entails promoting unified standards for accounting, clearing and 
settlement, capital sufficiency, risk management, and market 
manipulation. As E.U. derivatives regulation shifts from drafting to 
implementation, questions arise regarding the new E.U. member 
states. How does the “new E.U. ten” measure up to current E.U. 
derivatives standards? In particular, how do the heavyweights—
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary—measure up?10 
When the E.U. Parliament passed its 1995 derivatives 
resolution, the Polish, Czech, and Hungarian markets lacked any 
notable derivatives trading, exchange oriented or otherwise.11 As 
the Commission released the FSAP in 1999, Hungary’s futures 
exchange was barely three years old; Poland’s futures market had 
existed for one year; and a Czech equivalent was still two years 
away from organization.12 Although derivatives markets were up 
                                                                                                          
at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/696&format=HT 
ML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  
10 See, e.g., Int’l Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, Sept. 
2004, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2004/02/data/. IMF figures show that 
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary dwarf their fellow E.U. entrants in terms of 
total GDP: 
 
NEW E.U. TEN 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, CURRENT PRICES 
(IN BILLIONS, USD) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 
POLAND 186 191 209 230 
CZECH REPUBLIC 61 74 90 103 
HUNGARY 52 65 83 98 
SLOVAKIA 21 24 33 40 
SLOVENIA 20 22 28 33 
LITHUANIA 12 14 18 22 
CYPRUS 9 10 13 15 
LATVIA 8 9 11 13 
ESTONIA 6 7 9 11 
MALTA  4 4 4 5 
 
11 See, e.g., Bank for Int’l Settlements, Triennial Central Bank Survey: Foreign 
Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity in 2004, at 19 (March 2005) [hereinafter 
BIS Derivatives Survey 2004], available at http://www.bis.org/ publ/rpfx05t.pdf; Bank 
for Int’l Settlements, Monetary and Econ. Dep’t, Triennial Central Bank Survey: 
Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity 1998, at 19 (May 1999) 
[hereinafter BIS Derivatives Survey 1998], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
r_fx98finaltxt.pdf.  
12 See, e.g., Press Release, Prague Stock Exch., On 2nd August 2001, the Prague 
Stock Exchange, a. s., Obtained Permission to Organise Derivatives Trading (Mar. 8, 
2001), http://www.pse.cz/burza/default.asp?ka=323; Ewa Krawczyk, Rynek 
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and running, Czech and Hungarian over-the-counter (OTC, i.e., 
non-exchange-traded) derivatives trading dipped precipitously in 
the period from 1998 to 2001 (see Fig. 1).13 More fundamentally, 
the capital markets of all three nations were notoriously illiquid.14  
AVERAGE DAILY TURNOVER OF REPORTED OTC DERIVATIVES 
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Fig. 1 (created by the author based on of BIS figures) 
Despite such shaky first steps, the financial scene in Central 
and Eastern Europe has undergone rapid transformation, especially 
in Poland. Although recent press and scholarship suggest that the 
capital markets of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary show 
                                                                                                          
kontraktów terminowych czyli gra na przyszłość [The Market for Forward Contracts, 
or a Bet on the Future], BANKIER.PL, June 25, 2004, available at 
http://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosci/print.html?article_id=1166384; Budapest Stock 
Exchange, http://www.bse.hu/onlinesz/index_e.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2006).  
13 BIS Derivatives Survey 2004, supra note 11, at 19; BIS Derivatives Survey 
1998, supra note 11, at 19.  
14 See, e.g., Zbigniew Kominek, Stock Markets and Industry Growth: an Eastern 
European Perspective, 36 APPLIED ECON. 1025, at 1026–27 (2004); ORGANIZATION 
FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS 2004: 
POLAND 146 (June 2004) [hereinafter OECD POLAND SURVEY]; Ryszard 
Kokoszczyński & Andrzej Sławiński, Poland’s Vulnerability to Turbulence in the 
Financial Markets, BIS POL’Y PAPERS (Nov. 1999), available at http://www.bis.org/ 
publ/plcy08h.pdf. 
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signs of increased liquidity,15 derivatives-related developments in 
Poland merit special attention for two reasons.  
First, Poland has experienced a steady increase in OTC 
derivatives trading. While Czech and Hungarian OTC derivatives 
trading dipped from 1998 to 2001, OTC derivatives trading has 
consistently risen in Poland since 1995 (see Fig. 1).16 In 2004, 
Poland’s average daily turnover in reported OTC derivatives stood 
at $6 billion; $2 billion more than the Czech Republic and Hungary 
combined. 
Second, the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) is the largest in 
Eastern Europe.17 In the first quarter of 2005, the WSE posted the 
third highest number of initial public offerings (IPOs) in Europe 
after the London and Copenhagen exchanges.18 As one investment 
banker recently commented, “The Polish equity market is 
attractive…because it has depth and maturity with a number of 
liquid stocks, good daily turnover and a well developed derivatives 
market.”19  
As a key economic player among newly minted E.U. members, 
Poland demands a closer look. The region’s quickly growing 
derivatives markets and increasingly liquid capital markets require 
analysis of E.U. derivatives regulation. In addition, an assessment 
 
 
15 See, e.g., Kominek, supra note 14, at 1028–29; Kester Eddy, Young Gun, 
Attila Szalay-Berzevicky: The New Face of the Budapest Stock Exchange, BUS. HUNG., 
Sept. 2004, available at http://www.businesshungary.com/september/trends01.html.  
16 BIS Derivatives Survey 2004, supra note 11, at 19; BIS Derivatives Survey 
1998, supra note 11, at 19.  
17 OECD POLAND SURVEY, supra note 14, at 146, 185. The OECD notes that 
2003 WSE market capitalization almost equaled the combined value of the next three 
largest exchanges: Budapest, Prague, and Ljubljana. Id. In 2002, the WSE became the 
first exchange in Central and Eastern Europe to enter a cross-membership and cross-
access agreement with the Euronext Stock Exchange (a merger of the Paris, 
Amsterdam, and Brussels exchanges). See id.; Péter Oszlay, Marriage Plans: 
Budapest Stock Exchange Seeks Partners, BUS. HUNG., Mar. 2002, available at 
http://www.amcham.hu/BusinessHungary/16-03/articles/16-03_26.asp. The Euronext 
link will help the WSE trim transaction costs for Western European traders who wish 
to tap the Polish market and help international firms with Eastern European operations 
to issue shares. OECD POLAND SURVEY, supra note 14, at 146. 
18 See Warsaw Stock Exchange Enjoys Third Largest Number of Debuts in 
Europe in Q1 2005, POLAND BUS. NEWS, Apr. 1, 2005. 
19 Press Release, Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, DrKW Broadens Its Equities 
Platform to Offer Trading for Institutional Investor Clients in Polish Blue-chip Stocks 
and Derivatives (Feb. 16, 2005), available at http://www.drkw.com/eng/press/ 
Archive_2005_2753.php; see also Polish Market Proves a Draw, INT’L SEC. FIN., Mar. 
2005, available at http://www.isfmagazine.com/default.asp?page=7&PubID=41&ISS 
=13004&SID=482111&ReturnPage=5. 
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of Poland’s performance in this pan-European regulatory 
framework should be reviewed. The key question is how well 
Poland has managed to implement FSAP-initiated measures for 
derivatives regulation. 
 
B. Overview 
 
The present article proposes to answer this question by 
providing an on-the-ground account of current developments in the 
Polish derivatives markets. In particular, this article will examine 
three vital areas of derivatives in the Polish market: market 
manipulation, close-out netting, and accounting standards. This 
article will pose practical questions in light of the legal framework 
of the E.U. derivatives regime.  
Part II will briefly discuss the various types of derivatives and 
provides useful background for those unfamiliar with derivatives. 
Those who are familiar with derivatives, the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (ISDA), and their function in the 
financial markets should proceed directly to Part III.  
Part III will give a concise overview of the historical and 
continuing development of European derivatives regulation. This 
Part will establish a basis for categorizing and comprehending such 
regulation.  
Part IV will assess the efforts of Polish regulators to implement 
E.U. anti-manipulation, netting, and accounting norms in the 
context of derivatives. In addressing legal risk, this article argues 
that Polish legislators must update their bankruptcy statute to make 
it more equitable in close-out situations. Regarding market 
manipulation, this work contends that Polish regulators have not 
gone far enough in their efforts to combat manipulation on the 
Warsaw exchange. Polish prosecutors must enforce recently 
enacted, E.U.-influenced Polish laws prohibiting manipulation. 
Further, in the realm of derivatives accounting, Polish and E.U. 
regulators must limit the ability of publicly traded companies to 
hide financial risk by failing to reflect derivatives at fair market 
value on their balance sheets.  
Part V will set forth conclusions.  
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II. WHAT ARE DERIVATIVES? 
 
A. Fundamental Forms of Derivative Contract 
 
1. Derivatives in general 
 
As its name implies, a derivatives contract draws its value from 
some underlying asset (the “underlying”). The underlying can be 
physical (a commodity such as corn, steel, or oil) or financial 
(equity and debt securities, stock indexes, interest rates, currencies, 
or other derivatives). While simply describing derivatives poses 
little problem, defining them legally can be much more challenging. 
The regulator’s challenge is to avoid both over-inclusion and 
under-inclusion in the face of “an endless array of new products 
regularly introduced into the marketplace, many of which possess 
characteristics that do not easily fit into any established category of 
financial instruments.”20 Nonetheless, even the most complex 
derivatives contract possesses one or both of two primary elements: 
a forward element and an option element.21  
 
2. Forwards 
 
A forward contract is an agreement that “obligates one 
counterparty to buy, and the other counterparty to sell, a specific 
underlying at a specific price, amount, and date in the future.”22 To 
use a physical example, Gillette might need a large amount of 
ethanol for use in its aftershave products. Since ethanol comes 
chiefly from corn, the price of ethanol varies with crop yields and 
other variables. Gillette wants a price that will preserve a favorable 
rate of return on its product; the ethanol producer wants the same 
thing.  
To reduce risk, the two parties could enter into a contract that 
would allow both to fix the ethanol price in advance. Gillette, the 
buyer in this case, is taking a “long” position and the seller takes a 
“short” position. By selling forward, the ethanol producer places on 
 
 
20 GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 7. 
21 See, e.g., id.  
22 Id. at 13 (citing GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVES: 
PRACTICES AND PRINCIPALS 30 (Group of Thirty 1993)); see also Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, More Than Just a “New Financial Bingo”: A Risk-Based Approach to 
Understanding Derivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, at 9 (1997).  
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Gillette the risk that ethanol prices might go down. Through its 
long position, Gillette is able to shift the risk that ethanol prices 
might go up. The name for this mutual risk exchange is hedging; 
the symmetry of risk stands at the heart of forward agreements and 
distinguishes them from options.23  
 
3. Options 
 
An option is the right to buy or sell a specific underlying asset 
at a specified price (strike price) on or before a specific future 
date.24 A right to purchase the underlying—e.g., common stock—is 
a “call option” while a right to sell the underlying is a “put option.” 
If the price of the underlying moves favorably—above the strike 
price for a call and below the strike price for a put—the option 
holder can exercise the option and enjoy profits. If the price of the 
underlying moves unfavorably, the holder can choose not to 
exercise the option and has forfeited only the premium paid for the 
option. In other words, the option holder has a right but not the 
obligation to exercise the option.25 
The same does not hold true for the party who writes the 
option. The option writer possesses a legal obligation to buy—
when the holder exercises her put—or sell—when the buyer 
exercises her call—the underlying. This fact stresses the 
asymmetrical risk of options. Whereas forward-based derivatives 
give rise to a symmetrical obligation in which the seller’s loss 
equals the buyer’s gain or vice versa, an option holder only ever 
forfeits the price of the option premium while the option writer’s 
loss is potentially unlimited.26 Like forwards, options serve for 
hedging or speculation.27 
 
B. Exchange-traded Derivatives 
 
Public exchanges provide forums of exchange for both forward- 
and option-based derivatives. Like any such trade, the benefit of 
 
 
23 See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 13; Krawiec, supra note 22, at 10.  
24 See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 17; Krawiec, supra note 22, at 11.  
25 See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 17–18; Krawiec, supra note 22, at 
11–12.  
26 Krawiec, supra note 22, at 11–12. 
27 For a detailed explanation of how options can be used to hedge, see Krawiec, 
supra note 22, at 12; see, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALY & STEWART C. MEYERS, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 562 (McGraw-Hill 2003) (1981).  
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exchange-traded derivatives results from the efficiencies of a 
standardized contract. Parties do not need to dicker specially 
tailored terms regarding method of payment, time and place of 
delivery, the quality of the underlying, and so forth—price and 
quantity are the only subjects of negotiation. A future is a forward-
based derivative that is exchange-traded and fully standardized in 
this manner. Standardization makes futures highly liquid.28 High 
liquidity also characterizes exchange-traded options.  
Futures exchanges possess peculiar mechanics. When a party 
either buys or sells a futures contract, the future price fixes 
immediately with payments made only after the contract reaches 
maturity. As a result, exchanges require parties to a futures contract 
to put up some collateral or “margin” in either the form of cash or 
some other highly liquid asset. Putting up collateral or “margin” 
demonstrates that parties have money to execute their side of the 
bargain. Another exchange peculiarity is “marking-to-market.” To 
mark their contract to market, each party calculates and accounts 
for any profits or losses on the contract.  
Both of these mechanical aspects—margin and marking-to-
market—require an exchange-designated clearinghouse to handle 
all of the back and forth between parties. The exchange’s 
clearinghouse requires payment for any losses and the exchange 
pays out any profits on a given contract. At the end of a trade, the 
parties perform a “clearance,” which is a basic recognition and 
calculation of all obligations under the trade. “Settlement” is the 
physical act of paying and receiving final payment under a mutual 
obligation. The European Commission’s Giovannini Report 
explained the mechanics thus:  
 
The execution of derivatives trades typically takes 
place via direct members of exchanges, and the 
clearinghouse acts as central counterparty for all 
such trades. While clearing and settlement are 
simply post-execution stages in a securities 
transaction, clearing is the core process for the 
creation of an exchange-traded derivative. As the 
clearing process is integral to the very existence of 
a market for exchange-traded derivatives, the 
[central counterparty] plays a role that is analogous 
to a [central securities depository] in a securities 
 
 
28 See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 22, at 10. 
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market. The market structures for exchange-traded 
derivatives have evolved very differently from 
those for the fixed income and equity markets.29  
 
C. Over-the-counter (OTC) Derivatives 
 
1. Introduction: ISDA and the OTC markets 
 
As of April 2004, the estimated daily global turnover in OTC 
derivatives totaled US$3.5 trillion; the notional amounts—“sum of 
the nominal absolute value of all deals concluded and still open at 
the reference date”—stood at US$221 trillion in June 2004.30 About 
seventy-five percent of the outstanding notional amount seeks to 
control—or exploit—risks related to interest rates, and almost the 
entire balance centers on managing foreign-exchange exposure.31 In 
a poll of 386 major corporations across sixteen countries, seventy-
three percent of respondents reported using derivatives to manage 
interest rate exposure and ninety-six percent used currency 
derivatives.32  
Most organizations that deal in privately negotiated, OTC 
derivatives belong to the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA), which currently numbers over 500 member 
institutions in over thirty countries.33 Chartered in 1985, ISDA 
 
 
29 Eur. Comm’n Directorate Gen. for Econ. and Fin. Aff., Economic Papers: The 
Giovannini Group, Cross-border Clearing and Settlement Arrangements in the 
European Union, November 2001, 163, 21 (Feb. 2002) [hereinafter Giovannini 
Report], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/ 
economic_papers/2002/ecp163en.pdf.  
30 BIS Derivatives Survey 2004, supra note 11, at 4, 15. 
31 See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 23. 
32 Id. at 20.  
33 See About ISDA, http://www.isda.org/wwa/wwa_nav.html (last visited Mar. 
23, 2006); cf. Sean M. Flanagan, Student Article, The Rise of a Trade Association: 
Group Interactions Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211, 228 (2001). Flanagan relates: 
 
As of January 2001, ISDA has over 500 member 
organizations; more than 200 of these are Primary Members, about 
160 are Associate Members, and over 130 are Subscribers. The 
Primary Membership is composed of dealers and encompasses 
banks, securities companies, and large corporations from over 
thirty countries, including institutions such as Barclays; Chase 
Manhattan Bank; Credit Suisse First Boston International; 
Deutsche Bank AG; Enron Corporation; Sumitomo Bank Capital 
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emerged as an organization whose mission was to create and 
promote standardized documentation for derivatives at a time when 
even simple derivatives transactions had high transaction costs.34 
The first widely used ISDA documentation was the 1987 Master 
Agreement. The 1992 Master Agreement and the 2002 Master 
Agreement followed.35 The Master Agreements set forth 
standardized, market-driven terms regulating general obligations of 
the parties, events of default, netting, early termination, transfer, 
currency provisions, and definitions.36 If parties desire to modify 
any default provisions in the Master Agreement for their 
transaction, they may do so in an amending document called a 
“Schedule.”37 The Master Agreement and Schedule, in turn, are 
given effect in “confirmations,” which are documents that serve as 
evidence of individual transactions under a Master Agreement, 
setting forth material terms such as interest rates/currency 
conversion rates, time to maturity of the transaction, and so forth.38 
One of the key benefits of using the ISDA Master Agreement is 
that once in place between two parties, all transactions entered into 
under the agreement constitute a single agreement.39 Highlighting 
the practical benefit of a “single agreement” structure, Sean 
Flanagan explains: 
                                                                                                          
Markets, Inc.; and Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. The Associate 
Membership includes diverse professional firms and corporations 
such as Allen & Overy; the Chicago Mercantile Exchange; 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore; Euroclear; KPMG Peat Marwick, 
L.L.P.; Standard & Poor's; and QT Software AG. Subscribers 
include end-users of derivatives such as the African Development 
Bank; British Petroleum Company, P.L.C.; Ford Motor Credit 
Company; IBM Corporation; McDonald's Corporation; the 
Kingdom of Belgium; and Soros Fund Management, L.L.C.  
 
Id. 
34 See About ISDA, supra note 33; cf. Flanagan, supra note 33, at 227–38. 
35 See ISDA Opinions and Documentation, http://www.isda.org/docproj/ncdproj. 
html (last visited Mar. 21, 2006). 
36 See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT 
(2002) [hereinafter 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT]; INT’L SWAP DEALERS ASS’N, ISDA 
MASTER AGREEMENT (1992).  
37 See INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA SCHEDULE TO THE 2002 
MASTER AGREEMENT (2002); INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, ISDA SCHEDULE TO 
THE MASTER AGREEMENT (1992). 
38 See Flanagan, supra note 33, at 230.  
39 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 36, at 1 (“All Transactions are entered 
into in reliance on the fact that this Master Agreement and all Confirmations form a 
single agreement between the parties…and the parties would not otherwise enter into 
any Transactions.”). 
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An end-user corporation and a swap dealer may 
exchange large numbers of confirmations over the 
course of several years, resulting in hundreds of 
simultaneous swaps between the parties. Without a 
master agreement, these swaps would require that 
the two parties exchange hundreds of payments at 
each swap payment date. The terms of the ISDA 
Master Agreement, however, can provide for 
netting the payments among all transactions made 
under the agreement between the parties (called 
“cross-transaction payment netting”). This reduces 
transaction costs since numerous swap payments are 
incorporated into a single payment.40 
 
Adding to the payment netting regime, the ISDA Master Agreement 
also provides for “close-out netting” that applies when one party to 
a transaction defaults or declares bankruptcy.41 Close-out netting 
allows the non-defaulting party to “calculate a single settlement 
amount by offsetting its scheduled future payment and delivery 
obligations to the bankrupt party against the bankrupt party’s 
obligations to it.”42 The practical benefit of a close-out netting 
arrangement is that it precludes a trustee or liquidator in bankruptcy 
from “cherry picking”—i.e., repudiating all trades that are out of 
the money for the bankrupt estate while insisting on performance of 
all trades that accrue to the estate’s benefit.43  
Among the ever-expanding universe of derivatives governed by 
the ISDA Master Agreement, plain vanilla swaps and forward rate 
agreements remain the most used derivatives.44 
 
2. Swaps and forward rate agreements 
 
A swap is basically a series of forward transactions.45 The need 
for a swap arises, for instance, when a company has incurred debt 
that carries a fixed interest rate and the debtor would prefer a 
floating rate. If a company with a fixed-rate liability can find a 
 
 
40 Flanagan, supra note 33, at 230–31.  
41 See 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 36, at 11–15. 
42 Flanagan, supra note 33, at 231. 
43 S. Rory Derham, Set-off and Netting of Foreign Exchange Contracts in the 
Liquidation of a Counterparty: Part 2, Netting, 1991 J. BUS. L. 536, 537 (Nov. 1991).  
44 BIS Derivatives Survey 2004, supra note 11, at Annex II.  
45 Krawiec, supra note 22, at 10. 
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counterparty with floating-rate liabilities who wishes for the 
opposite, the parties can exchange interest payments during a 
negotiated contractual term. Practitioners refer to such transactions 
as fixed-for-floating interest-rate swaps, or simply “plain vanilla 
swaps.”46 Alternatively, much of a company’s cash flow might be 
in the form of pesos but the company would prefer dollars. In such 
cases, the companies can enter into an analogous currency swap. 
Less used but also important are commodity and equity swaps. In 
most swap transactions—except for currency swaps—custom 
dictates that the parties do not exchange the notional principal, 
instead netting all interim payments.47 
A forward-rate agreement (FRA) arises in contexts where one 
party knows that at the end of period X it will need to incur short-
term debt but worries that interest rates will rise in the interim. The 
FRA allows such parties to lock in the interest rates with a bank. 
Applying the same netting that applies in swaps, if interest rates are 
higher than the negotiated percentage rate at the end of period X, 
then the bank pays the difference. Likewise, if the interest rate is 
lower, the party owes the bank any difference.  
 
III. E.U. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK FOR DERIVATIVES REGULATION 
 
A. A General Framework of E.U. Derivatives Provisions 
 
DERIVATIVES-RELATED E.U. STATUTES 
CATEGORY STATUTE YEAR 
Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 
1992, Relating to Direct Insurance Other 
than Life Assurance, 1992 O.J. (L 228) 1 
1992 
Parliament and Council Directive 
2000/12/EC of 20 March 2000, Relating 
to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the 
Business of Credit Institutions, Annex III, 
2000 O.J. (L 126) 1, 52 
2000 
 
 
 
 
RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
Council Regulation 1346/2000 of 29 May 
2000, On Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 
O.J. (L 160) 1, arts. 4, 6 (EC) 
2000 
 
 
46 See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 16–17. 
47 See, e.g., id.  
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CATEGORY STATUTE YEAR 
Parliament and Council Directive 
2001/108/EC of 21 Jan. 2002, Amending 
Council Directive 85/611 Relating to 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities (UCITS), 2002 
O.J. (L 41) 35 
 
 
2002 
 
Parliament and Council Directive 
2002/83/EC of 5 Nov. 2002, Concerning 
Life Assurance, 2002 O.J. (L 345) 1 
2002 
 
 
RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
(CONT.) 
 
Parliament and Council Directive 
2004/39/EC of 21 Apr. 2004, On Markets 
in Financial Instruments, 2004 O.J. (L 
145) 1 
2004 
Parliament and Council Directive 
98/26/EC of 19 May 1998, On Settlement 
Finality in Payment and Securities 
Settlement Systems, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 45
1998 
Parliament and Council Directive 
2000/12/EC of 20 Mar. 2000, Relating to 
the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business 
of Credit Institutions, Annex III, 2000 
O.J. (L 126) 1, 52 
 
2000 
 
 
 
 
SETTLEMENT 
AND 
CLEARANCE 
Parliament and Council Directive 
2002/47/EC of 6 June 2002, On Financial 
Collateral Arrangements, 2002 O.J. (L 
168) 43 
2002 
Council Regulation 2223/96 of 25 June 
1996, On the European System of 
National and Regional Accounts in the 
Community, 1996 O.J. (L 310) 1 (EC) 
1996 
 
 
 
 
ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commission Recommendation 
2000/408/EC of 23 June 2000, 
Concerning Disclosure of Information on 
Financial Instruments and Other Items 
Complementing the Disclosure Required 
According to Council Directive 
86/635/EEC on the Annual Accounts and 
Consolidated Accounts of Banks and 
Other Financial Institutions, 2000 O.J.   
(L 154) 36 
 
 
 
 
2000 
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CATEGORY STATUTE YEAR 
Parliament and Council Regulation 
2558/2001/EC of 3 Dec. 2001, Amending 
Council Regulation 2223/96 as Regards 
the Reclassification of Settlements Under 
Swaps Arrangements and Under Forward 
Rate Agreements 2001 O.J. (L 344) 1 
 
 
2001 
Parliament and Council Regulation 
1606/2002 of 19 July 2002, On the 
Application of International Accounting 
Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1 
2002 
 
 
 
 
 
ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS 
(CONT.) 
Commission Regulation 707/2004 of 6 
Apr. 2004, Amending Regulation 
1725/2003 Adopting Certain International 
Accounting Standards in Accordance with 
Regulation 1606/2002 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, 2004 O.J. 
(L 111) 13 (EC) 
 
 
2004 
MARKET 
MANIPULATION 
Parliament and Council Directive 
2003/6/EC of 28 Jan. 2003, On Insider 
Dealing and Market Manipulation 
(Market Abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 
 
2003 
 
Perhaps owing to the history and nature of exchange-traded 
derivatives, E.U. regulators have never seen fit to define them, 
leaving the task to individual exchanges. The first E.U. effort to 
grapple with a legislative definition of OTC derivatives came in 
1993. In its Directive 93/6 of 15 March 1993, the Council provided:  
 
[O]ver-the-counter (OTC) derivative instruments 
shall mean the interest-rate and foreign-exchange 
contracts referred to in Annex II to Directive 
89/EC/EEC [amended by Annex III to Directive 
2000/12/EC] and off-balance-sheet contracts based 
on equities, provided that no such contracts are 
traded on recognized exchanges where they are 
subject to daily margin requirements and, in the 
case of foreign-exchange contracts, that every such 
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contract has an original maturity of more than 14 
calendar days.48 
 
Annex III to Directive 2001/12 enumerates a long list of derivatives 
contracts, including single-currency interest-rate swaps, basis-
swaps, forward-rate agreements, interest-rate futures, interest-rate 
options, and many variations on such contracts.49 Although such a 
definition appears prescriptive, the Council in fact left the field of 
possible derivative contracts wide open, recognizing all “other 
contracts of a similar nature.”50  
Upon initial consideration, the development of E.U. derivatives 
norms seems both disparate and diffuse—spread out over more than 
a decade. One first recognizes that twice as many derivatives-
related provisions appeared in the five years following 
announcement of the FSAP as did in the seven years preceding. 
Indeed, the categories and guidelines contained in the FSAP allow 
one to sort E.U. derivatives legislation into four broad categories: 
risk management, clearance and settlement, accounting, and market 
manipulation.51  
 
 
48 Council Directive 93/6/EEC, supra note 5, art. 2(10), at 1, 4. 
49 Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC of 20 March 2000, Relating to 
the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions, Annex III, 2000 O.J. 
(L 126) 1, 52.  
50 Id.  
51 The key risk-management provisions include: Council Directive 92/49/EEC, 
supra note 5; Parliament and Council Directive 2000/12/EC of 21 Jan. 2002, supra 
note 49; Council Regulation 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000, On Insolvency Proceedings, 
2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EC); Parliament and Council Directive 2001/108/EC of 21 Jan. 
2002, Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities, 
2002 O.J. (L 41) 35; Parliament and Council Directive 2002/83/EC of 5 Nov. 2002, 
Concerning Life Assurance, 2002 O.J. (L 345) 1; Parliament and Council Directive 
2004/39/EC of 21 Apr. 2004, On Markets in Financial Instruments, 2004 O.J.            
(L 145) 1.  
For provisions relating to settlement and clearance: Parliament and Council 
Directive 98/26/EC of 19 May 1998, On Settlement Finality in Payment and Securities 
Settlement Systems, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 45; Parliament and Council Directive 
2000/12/EC, supra note 49; Parliament and Council Directive 2002/47/EC of 6 June 
2002, On Financial Collateral Arrangements, 2002 O.J. (L 168) 43.  
To see E.U. provisions on accounting standards, consult: Council Regulation 
2223/96 of 25 June 1996, On the European System of National and Regional Accounts 
in the Community, 1996 O.J. (L 310) 1 (EC); Commission Recommendation 
2000/408/EC of 23 June 2000, Concerning Disclosure of Information on Financial 
Instruments and Other Items Complementing the Disclosure Required According to 
Council Directive 86/635/EEC on the Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts of 
Banks and Other Financial Institutions, 2000 O.J. (L 154) 36; Parliament and Council 
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Prerequisite to grasping the E.U. regime of derivatives 
provisions, one must appreciate the practical difference between 
directives and regulations. Regulations are binding statutory 
measures—binding as to both ends and means—directly applicable 
to all member states.52 “The phrase ‘directly applicable’...signifies 
that regulations are taken to be part of the national legal systems 
automatically, without the need for separate national legal 
measures.”53 In the wake of a regulation, an E.U. member state 
might need to modify its law to effect compliance.  
Directives, in distinction, are binding only with regard to their 
end purpose. Directives give member states legislative leeway in 
choosing the form and method of implementation. Another key 
difference between directives and regulations is that directives must 
be “notified to the person to whom they are addressed.”54 
“Directives are particularly useful when the aim is to harmonize the 
laws within a certain area or to introduce complex legislative 
change.”55 Thus, given the “complex changes” occasioned by 
efforts to harmonize member states’ derivatives regulations, it is 
little surprise that most E.U. derivatives provisions are directives. 
This is true of risk management harmonization.  
 
B. Risk Management 
 
1. Market, counterparty, and other risks 
 
The seminal initiatives that require companies and central 
banks to manage derivatives-related risk come from the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision.56 The Basle Committee 
                                                                                                          
Regulation 2558/2001/EC of 3 Dec. 2001, Regarding the Reclassification of 
Settlements Under Swaps Arrangements and Under Forward Rate Agreements 2001 
O.J. (L 344) 1; Parliament and Council Regulation 1606/2002 of 19 July 2002, On the 
Application of International Accounting Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1 (EC); 
Commission Regulation 707/2004 of 6 Apr. 2004, Amending Regulation 1725/2003 
Adopting Certain International Accounting Standards in Accordance with Regulation 
1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2004 O.J. (L 111) 3 (EC). 
For the E.U. statute on market manipulation, consult Parliament and Council 
Directive 2003/6/EC of 28 Jan. 2003, On Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation 
(Market Abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16. 
52 PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXTS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 
112–14 (Oxford 2003). 
53 Id. at 113. 
54 Id. at 114. 
55 Id. at 115. 
56 See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 62.  
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW  VOLUME 2 
 
 250   
released its Risk Management Guidelines for Derivatives in 1996 
(Basel Guidelines).57 The Basle Guidelines enumerate five 
fundamental risks: credit and settlement risk (counterparty’s failure 
to perform under an obligation), market risk (risk stemming from 
exogenous factors such as interest rate and currency rate 
movements), liquidity risk (inability to offset a derivatives position 
with a matching position in an illiquid market), operations risk 
(human error and information systems failure), and legal risk 
(unenforceability of a contract).58 The culmination or simultaneous 
realization of these risks is often termed “systemic risk.”59 
Awareness of these risks has been reflected in derivatives 
regulations the world over, including regulations in the E.U. In the 
FSAP, the Commission resolved to present proposals that would 
maintain high standards of banking, insurance, and securities 
legislation. To this end, taking into account the work of existing 
bodies is helpful when possible (Basle Committee, FESCO, etc.).60  
The first E.U. provision to deal with an aspect of derivatives 
risk management antedated both FSAP and Basle guidelines. In 
Directive 92/49/EEC, the Council stated that where insurance 
companies use derivatives, member states must ensure that: 
“derivative instruments…may be used in so far as they contribute 
to a reduction of investment risks or facilitate efficient portfolio 
management. They must be valued on a prudent basis and may be 
taken into account in the valuation of the underlying assets.”61 
Hinting at the substance of regulations to come, the Council’s 
approach in Directive 92/49 evidenced concern that the market risk 
associated with so-called “speculative derivatives use” might 
endanger the cash flow and reserves of insurance providers. As a 
result, E.U. regulators restricted insurance companies’ permitted 
use of derivatives to hedging activities. 
 
 
57 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMMITTEE: RISK MANAGEMENT 
GUIDELINES FOR DERIVATIVES (July 1994), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/ 
bcbsc211.htm. 
58 Id.  
59 Krawiec, supra note 22, at 51.  
60 FSAP, supra note 1, at 14. 
61 Council Directive 92/49/EEC, supra note 5, art. 21(C)(iv), at 13. In addition, 
Parliament and Council Directive 2002/83/EC, supra note 51, provides in nearly 
identical terms that life insurance companies can only use derivatives to hedge.  
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The “hedging only” standard still proved it insufficient to solve 
the problem of speculative derivative use.62 Investors entered into 
derivative securities contracts that—to the negligently or willfully 
uninformed—appeared risk free, but which turned out to be highly 
leveraged instruments.63 Hedging exercises turned into debacles. As 
a result, the E.U. in a post-Barings, post-Parmalat, post-FSAP 
world shifted its focus and enacted more specific provisions that 
gave parties less room to “fudge.”  
For instance, beyond imposing a restriction on insurance fund 
managers to use derivatives only for hedging, post-FSAP 
provisions impose a duty on brokers to ascertain the sophistication 
and risk profile of their customers:  
 
[Investment firms] shall obtain the necessary 
information regarding the client’s or potential 
client’s knowledge and experience in the investment 
field relevant to the specific type of product or 
service, his financial situation and his investment 
objectives so as to enable the firm to recommend to 
the client or potential client the investment services 
and financial instruments that are suitable for him.64 
 
More examples of prescriptive rules aimed at minimizing risk arise 
in Directive 2001/108, amending an earlier directive on 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities 
(UCITS).65 The Parliament and the Council addressed UCTIS to 
investment and hedge funds of all stripes.66 Adding to the binding 
 
 
62 See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 19 (noting the loss of hundreds of 
millions of dollars through use of structured notes that seemed fit for hedging); FRANK 
PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.: THE INSIDE STORY OF A WALL STREET TRADER 55–61 
(Penguin Books 1999) (relating Morgan Stanley’s sale of principal exchange rate 
linked securities (PERLS) seemingly benign derivatives that were involved in many 
customer losses).  
63 See, e.g., GENGATHAREN, supra note 6, at 19. 
64 Parliament and Council Directive 2004/39/EC, supra note 51, ch. 2, § 2, art. 
19(4), at 17.  
65 Parliament and Council Directive 2001/108/EC, supra note 51, Preamble, at 
36.  
66 Council Directive 85/611/EEC of Dec. 1985, On the Coordination of Laws, 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective 
Investment in Transferable Securities, art. 1(2), 1985 O.J. (L 375) 3. Article 1(2) 
reads:  
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obligation of brokers to assess customer risk tolerance, UCITS 
provides that parties to an OTC derivatives transaction must 
conduct ongoing assessment of their liquidity and market risk 
exposure. Taken together, post-FSAP risk-management directives 
give member states guidance aimed at more full integration of the 
Basle standards into national law. 
 
2. Legal risk: setoff and netting 
 
As mentioned in the discussion of close-out netting under an 
ISDA Master Agreement, a major risk in the derivatives setting is 
the possibility that a bankruptcy administrator will selectively try to 
enforce only those trades that are beneficial to the estate, in other 
words, to cherry pick.67 Although the close-out netting provisions 
of the Master Agreement attempt to deal with this legal risk, the 
chance remains that a transaction might be subject to the laws of a 
jurisdiction that does not recognize close-out netting.  
The E.U. addresses this problem within its own borders in its 
Insolvency Regulation.68 The Article 4(2) of the Insolvency 
Regulation sets forth a general rule that: “The law of the State of 
the opening of proceedings shall determine...the conditions under 
which set-offs may be invoked.”69 In the bankruptcy context, a set-
off is generally the right of a creditor to reduce obligations owed by 
the bankrupt party—typically an unpaid debt—by an amount that 
the creditor owes the bankrupt party—typically a deposit of the 
bankrupt party.70 Set-off, although related, is substantively different 
                                                                                                          
2. For the purposes of this Directive, and subject to Article 2, 
UCITS shall be undertakings: 
 
—the sole object of which is the collective investment in 
transferable securities of capital raised from the public and which 
operate on the principle of risk-spreading, and 
 
—the units of which are, at the request of holders, re-purchased or 
redeemed, directly or indirectly, out of those undertakings’ assets. 
Action taken by a UCITS to ensure that the stock exchange value 
of its units does not significantly vary from their net asset value 
shall be regarded as equivalent to such re-purchase or redemption. 
 
Id.  
67 See Derham, supra note 43, at 537. 
68 Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 51. The Insolvency Regulation has 
been of direct application in the E.U. since May 31, 2002. Id.  
69 Id. 
70 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 553 I(A) (2005).   
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from close-out netting because it involves the reduction of one 
mutual obligation. By contrast, close-out netting involves the 
reduction of an unlimited number of obligations—with varying 
amounts and maturities—to produce one sum that itself might be 
subject to set-off. Because the drafters of the Insolvency Regulation 
do not distinguish between set-off and netting—a distinction that 
was drawn in at least one later E.U. statute71—it seems that the 
drafters conflated the two, making the application of both close-out 
netting and set-off subject to the laws of each member state law.  
The general rule of Insolvency Regulation Article 4(2) dictates 
that if the law of a given member state prohibits set-offs altogether 
and a counterparty declares insolvency in that jurisdiction, the non-
bankrupt counterparty in a derivatives transaction is subject to 
cherry picking, thus preventing the execution of close-out netting or 
the enjoyment of set-off rights. To counterbalance such situations, 
E.U. legislators included Article 6(1), which provides that: “The 
opening of insolvency proceedings shall not affect the right of 
creditors to demand the set-off of their rights against the claims of 
the debtor, where such a set-off is permitted by the law applicable 
to the insolvent debtor’s claim.”72 Thus, as long as parties select 
netting and set-off-friendly jurisdictions to govern their ISDA 
Master Agreements (such as New York or the U.K.), the ability of 
member state bankruptcy administrators to cherry pick is muted by 
the Insolvency Regulation.    
 
C. Clearance and Settlement 
 
Two initial pieces of E.U. legislation addressed the topic of 
clearance and settlement—Directive 98/26 and Directive 2000/12. 
In subsequent legislation, Parliament remarked: “Directive 
98/26…constituted a milestone in establishing a sound legal 
framework for payment and securities settlement systems. 
Implementation of that Directive has demonstrated the importance 
of limiting systemic risk…and the benefits of common rules in 
relation to collateral constituted to such systems.”73 Despite the 
 
 
71 Parliament and Council Directive 2001/24/EC of 4 Apr. 2001, On the 
Reorganisation and Winding Up of Credit Institutions, 2001 O.J. (L 125) 15, art. 25 
(“Netting agreements shall be governed solely by the law of the contract which 
governs such agreements.”).   
72 Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 51, at 6. 
73 Parliament and Council Directive 2002/47/EC, supra note 51, Preamble, at 43. 
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changes affected by these initial two directives, settlement systems 
in the E.U. remained fragmented and the market suffered under 
resulting inefficiencies.74 The European Commission appointed the 
Giovannini Group to help resolve this issue.  
The Giovannini Group, led by Dr. Alberto Giovannini, formed 
in 1996 to advise the European Commission on issues “relating to 
EU financial integration and the efficiency of euro-denominated 
financial markets.”75 In February 2002, the Group issued a report 
on cross-border clearing and settlement arrangements. The Group 
stated: “The existing infrastructure for the provision of clearing and 
settlement services in the European Union is the product of a 
fragmented securities market....[T]he additional cost and risk 
associated with this fragmentation represents a significant 
limitation on the scope for cross-border securities trading in the 
European Union.”76 
In an effort to improve the system, the Group identified key 
market barriers that separated the settlement systems of member 
countries—technology barriers, differences in user agreements and 
market conventions—and encouraged a market-led convergence to 
common standards.77 Recognizing that perverse incentives might 
prevent market change, the Group accepted that E.U. intervention 
might be required.78 In the end, the Giovannini Report found more 
fragmentation in the settlement system for securities than for 
derivatives markets.79 
On June 6, 2002, the European Parliament and the Council 
issued Directive 2002/47 on financial collateral arrangements. The 
Parliament and Council tailored Directive 2002/47 to require use of 
“a central counterparty, settlement agent or clearing house” in 
 
 
74 Giovannini Report, supra note 29, at 19.  
75 Id. at 1.  
76 Id. at 20.  
77 Id. at 59–60.  
78 Id. at 60. Commenting in this regard, the Group wrote: “Such intervention 
could prove unavoidable as a means to overcome national sensitivities and/or the 
perverse incentives that exist for entities that profit by arbitraging inefficiencies in 
cross-border clearing and settlement.” Id. at 67. 
79 Id. at 7–19. The Group linked greater fragmentation in cross-border securities 
settlement to the greater number of actors and thus greater complexity in a typical 
cross-border securities transaction. Id. 
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exchange-traded derivatives transactions to lessen the effects of 
cross-boarder fragmentation.80  
 
D. Accounting 
 
The current story of derivatives accounting in the E.U. is the 
story of International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39. In July 2002, 
the Parliament and the Council issued a regulation that mandated 
obligatory application of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) as of January 1, 2005.81 Notably—like its law on 
insolvency proceedings—the E.U. instituted this measure using a 
regulation and not a directive.  
 
On December 1, 2004, a reporter noted:  
 
Few businesses...are as disgruntled with IFRS as the 
banks and financial institutions. This is because of a 
clause called IAS 39, which requires them to record 
a range of financial instruments, such as derivatives 
and bonds, at fair value on the balance sheet. Any 
changes in the value of these instruments must then 
be fed through the company’s income statement, or 
 
 
80 Parliament and Council Directive 2002/47/EC, supra note 51, art. 1(2)(d). In 
Parliament and Council Directive 98/26/EC, art. 2, the European Parliament and the 
Council defined the main terms as follows: 
 
(c) ‘central counterparty’ shall mean an entity which is 
interposed between the institutions in a system and which acts as 
the exclusive counterparty of these institutions with regard to their 
transfer orders;  
 
(d) ‘settlement agent’ shall mean an entity providing to 
institutions and/or a central counterparty participating in systems, 
settlement accounts through which transfer orders within such 
systems are settled and, as the case may be, extending credit to 
those institutions and/or central counterparties for settlement 
purposes;  
 
(e) ‘clearing house’ shall mean an entity responsible for the 
calculation of the net positions of institutions, a possible central 
counterparty and/or a possible settlement agent; 
 
Parliament and Council Directive 98/26/EC, supra note 51, art. 2. 
81 Parliament and Council Regulation 1606/2002, supra note 51. 
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else shown in shareholders’ equity, depending on 
the instrument. The impact could be big, given that, 
until recently, many financial assets and liabilities 
have been recorded at historical cost rather than fair 
value, or else not recorded on the balance sheet at 
all.82 
 
As indicated, the centerpiece of IAS 39 is greater use of fair value 
for all financial instruments.83 The International Accounting 
Standards Board stated: “Under this standard, all financial assets 
and financial liabilities should be recognized on the balance sheet, 
including all derivatives.... Subsequent to initial recognition, all 
financial assets should be remeasured to fair value.”84  
For exchange-traded derivatives, fair value is simply the market 
value of a future or option at any given time.85 Upon creation of a 
new balance sheet, all public companies with exchange-traded 
derivatives positions must mark the derivatives to market as either 
current assets or current liabilities. But what of OTC derivatives? 
What is the value of a contract that might not have any 
corresponding liquid market? In such situations, the first line of 
defense is to assess whether a materially similar, already-priced 
instrument exists.86 When this fails, a party can apply discounted 
cash flow analysis or employ an approved option pricing model.87 
Derivatives must be on the balance sheet and represented by some 
measurement of fair value—unless, as it turns out, an exception 
applies. 
As the date of IFRS compliance drew near, the Commission 
issued Regulation 707/2004 detailing how companies could comply 
with IFRS.88 The new Regulation contained a carve-out that applied 
to derivatives used in certain types of hedging transactions.89 The 
carve-out began by stating: “An entity shall not reflect in 
its...balance sheet a hedging relationship...that does not qualify for 
 
 
82 When Fair’s Fair, BUS. EUR., Dec. 2004, at 2 (article available with Author 
upon request). 
83 INT’L ACCT. STANDARDS BD., INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING 
STANDARDS 39-5 (2003) [hereinafter INT’L FIN. REPORTING STANDARDS]. 
84 Id. at 39-6.  
85 Id. at 39-50. 
86 Id. at 39-51.  
87 Id. 
88 Commission Regulation 707/2004, supra note 51.  
89 Id. at 10.  
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hedge accounting under IAS 39.”90 The provision then proceeded to 
list transactions where derivatives would be exempt, including: 
“many hedging relationships where the hedging instrument is a 
cash instrument or written option; where the hedged item is a net 
position; or where the hedge covers interest risk in a held-to-
maturity investment.”91 Explaining this otherwise baffling 
exemption, Jane Fuller writes for the Financial Times: 
 
IAS39...has been seriously compromised by 
objections, notably from French banks. They dislike 
the way traditional hedging practices are excluded 
from the hedge accounting definitions. As a result, 
the European parliament has bowed to business 
pressure and allowed “carve-outs”...from the mark-
to-market requirements. The ability to compare 
companies across borders has been diluted and a 
dangerous precedent has been set that political 
pressure can force changes to standards that are 
supposed to be set independently.92 
 
Thus, while adopting IAS 39 was a step in the right direction, 
its E.U. implementation has yet to show whether the carve-out will 
compromise the crucial underlying aim of more accurately 
reflecting all the liabilities—and assets—of publicly traded 
institutions.  
 
E. Market Manipulation 
 
Of the numerous E.U. regulations on derivatives, only one deals 
directly with market manipulation.93 Directive 2003/6 applies to, 
among others, exchange-based derivatives trades. Instead of 
enumerating all possible forms of manipulation, the Directive 
adopts a broad definition that accords member states power to 
pierce manipulative practices in a substance-over-form manner. 
Article 1(2)(a) provides that market manipulation means: 
 
 
 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Jane Fuller, Does Europe’s Accounts Overhaul Add Up?, FT.COM, Nov. 22, 
2004 (Westlaw). 
93 Parliament and Council Directive 2003/6/EC, supra note 51.  
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[T]ransactions or orders to trade: [i] which give, or 
are likely to give, false or misleading signals as to 
the supply of, demand for or price of financial 
instruments, or [ii] which secure, by a person, or 
persons acting in collaboration, the price of one or 
several financial instruments at an abnormal or 
artificial level, unless the person who entered into 
the transactions or issued the orders to trade 
establishes that his reasons for so doing are 
legitimate and that these transactions or orders to 
trade conform to accepted market practices on the 
regulated market concerned.94  
 
In a classic move of “minimum harmonization,” the Parliament 
and Council made clear that member states should impose 
administrative sanctions against any who violate the anti-
manipulation provisions, but likewise stressed that member states 
were free to impose extra criminal sanctions.95 “Member States 
shall ensure that these measures are effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive.”96 
 
IV. IMPLEMENTING E.U. DERIVATIVES LEGISLATION IN POLAND 
 
A. The Polish Derivatives Markets and Optimal  
Enforcement Efforts 
 
Despite E.U. legislators’ enactment of provisions to regulate 
four key aspects of derivatives trading, the European Commission 
cautioned that “[r]egulation alone does not deliver an integrated 
single market. The extent to which the FSAP will contribute to…a 
truly European market…now depends on the consistent and timely 
implementation of the FSAP measures at Member State level, 
convergence of national supervisory practices and rigorous 
enforcement.”97  
As E.U. and local officials promote and enforce derivatives 
regulations in new member states, questions arise such as where 
should they spend their efforts, which endeavors will carry the most 
 
 
94 Id. art. 1(2)(a), at 20. 
95 Id. art. 14(1), at 23. 
96 Id.  
97 Tenth Progress Report, supra note 1.  
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utility, and what level of enforcement is optimal? One category—
settlement and clearance—although crucial to the fluid operation of 
derivatives markets, does not require special government 
enforcement action in the new member states. However, other 
categories represent areas where E.U. and member state activism 
can effect further change.  
Government officials should not spend their efforts 
concentrating on derivatives settlement and clearance. As a primary 
matter, the Giovannini report found less fragmentation—and thus 
less risk of inefficiency in the European markets—where futures 
settlement and clearance was concerned.98 For futures transactions, 
the E.U. simply mandates that all exchanges use a central 
counterparty. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary all have 
central counterparties that meet E.U. standards, and thus the work 
of would-be enforcers is complete. 
The management of market, credit, operational, and liquidity 
risk is crucially important for the end-users of derivatives contracts. 
Although the prevalence of discrete derivatives-related risks varies 
across markets, the principles of risk management hold constant 
whether the parties are in London, Frankfurt, Prague, or Warsaw. 
However, to the extent that markets such as Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary might pose greater counterparty risk, 
market risk, or other such Basle-identified risks, European or local 
officials have limited capacity to minimize the risk. European and 
Polish legislatures took the important step of promulgating specific 
norms, and now the task lies in the hands of market participants to 
carefully follow sound practices as they enter into and service their 
derivatives contracts. Most solutions to market, counterparty, 
liquidity, and other risks will have to be market solutions, not 
solutions dictated or enforced from a central authority.  
One notable exception to this rule lies in market manipulation, 
which embody hazards that require the attention of local and E.U. 
regulators. Market manipulation is a prime concern in new member 
states due to the size of Eastern European exchanges, which—
despite recent progress—are significantly smaller and less liquid 
than leading exchanges in London, Frankfurt, and other financial 
centers. Recent corporate finance literature confirms that 
manipulation occurs much more often when exchanges are 
 
 
98 Giovannini Report, supra note 79, at 7–19.  
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relatively small, illiquid, and volatile.99 Underscoring this reality, 
the WSE has experienced recent instances of futures-trading 
manipulation. Since manipulation tends to be easier in smaller 
markets, E.U. market-manipulation provisions are a prime concern 
at the local level, particularly for local prosecutors. 
In like manner, the legal risk stemming from a specific 
provision of the Polish Bankruptcy Law of 2003 makes it possible 
that, despite the E.U. Insolvency Regulation, parties to an ISDA 
Master Agreement who have chosen Polish law as the law 
governing their trades could be subject to cherry picking by Polish 
bankruptcy administrators.100 Polish legislators must be aware of 
this risk and work to counteract the possible inequitable effects 
created by the bankruptcy statute. 
Whereas market manipulation and close-out netting pose 
special problems for Poland and other Eastern European markets, 
derivatives accounting standards pose a general problem for all 
E.U. member states. The carve-out introduced by European 
legislators into IAS 39 has such broad application that it threatens 
to swallow the rule that companies must reflect all derivatives 
liabilities on their balance sheets. In light of recent derivatives-
related accounting scandals in the United States, European and 
member-state regulators would do well to carefully scrutinize how 
 
 
99 See Rajesh K. Aggarwal and Guojun Wu, Student Article, Stock Market 
Manipulation—Theory and Evidence, 79 J. BUS. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 
22–24, available at http://www.afajof.org/pdfs/2004program/UPDF/P306_Asset_ 
Pricing.pdf). In the context of American markets, Rajesh Aggarwal and Guojun Wu 
explain: 
 
For example, 47.89% of all manipulation cases happen in the 
over-the-counter markets such as the OTC Bulletin Board and the 
Pink Sheets, and 33.81% of the cases happen in either regional 
exchanges or unidentified markets. About 17% of the cases occur 
on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq National Market combined. 
Overall, the OTC Bulletin Board, the Pink Sheets, and the regional 
exchanges are relatively inefficient in the sense that they are small 
and illiquid…Our results show that about over 50% of the stocks 
manipulated are “penny stocks” with very low average trading 
volume and market capitalization. 
 
Id. See also Paul G. Mahoney et al., Market Manipulation: A Comprehensive 
Study of Stock Pools, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 147–70 (2005), available at http://www.science 
direct.com (requires password). 
100 Ustawa z dnia 28 lutego 2003 r. Prawo upadłościowe i naprawcze [Statute of 
Feb. 28, 2003 on the Law of Bankruptcy and Workouts], Dz.U 2003 nr. 60 poz. 535 
[hereinafter Polish Bankruptcy Law].  
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companies are accounting for their derivatives contracts. To the 
extent that financial managers in Poland—or anywhere else—can 
exclude derivatives from the balance sheet or record them at 
historical cost, they can hide risk and potentially place investor 
welfare on the altar of smooth earnings. The following subsections 
will first discuss market manipulation, followed by accounting 
standards.  
 
B. Market Manipulation on the Polish Futures Exchange 
1. Background and the “100 second” scandal 
Futures trading on the WSE began in 1998, and futures 
represent the quickest growing sector of the WSE.101 The exchange 
makes it possible for investors to trade futures in euros, U.S. 
dollars, Polish treasury bonds, and certain WSE-listed stocks. In 
2003, the WSE recorded 4.2 million futures trades, representing an 
increase of approximately 1 million from the previous year.102 
Although developing robustly, the Warsaw futures exchange pales 
in comparison to world exchanges such as the Korea Futures 
Exchange—2.5 billion trades in 2004—or the Eurex—1.1 billion 
trades in 2004.103 Most futures trades on the WSE—some ninety-
eight percent—take place on the exchange’s “WIG 20,” which is an 
index of the WSE’s twenty blue-chip listed companies.104  
WSE options trading is not as mature as its futures counterpart, 
having only started operation on September 22, 2003.105 The WSE 
created its options exchange to complement its offering of 
derivatives that have the WIG 20 as their underlying asset. 
One Polish observer recently commented: “The [exchange-
traded] market for forward contracts, especially futures trading on 
the WIG 20, can be acknowledged as developed. Confirming this 
 
 
101 Krawczyk, supra note 12.  
102 Press Release, Warsaw Stock Exchange, Instrumenty pochodne w roku 
2003—podsumowanie [Derivatives in the Year 2003—A Summary] 1–3 (Jan. 9, 
2004) [hereinafter Derivatives Press Release], available at http://www.gpw.com.pl/ 
zrodla/gpw/pdf/090104opcje.pdf. 
103 Galen Burghardt, FIA Annual Volume Survey: The Invigorating Effects of 
Electronic Trading, FI MAG., Mar./Apr. 2005, available at http://www.futuresindustry 
.org/fimagazi-1929.asp?a=1026. 
104 Derivatives Press Release, supra note 102, at 1.  
105 Warsaw Stock Exchange, Opcje na GPW [Option Contracts on the WSE] 
(2003), available at http://www.gpw.com.pl/zrodla/gpw/pdf/artykul_opcje19.pdf. 
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fact are not only statistical data, but also the scandals that have 
begun to accompany such contracts.”106 The most prominent 
scandal in relation to WIG 20 futures trading took place on 
February 4, 2004.107  
Near the end of the day’s trading session, an investor from the 
Virgin Islands placed a number of large sell orders in quick 
succession through its broker.108 The sell orders set off an 
avalanche of stop orders—standing instructions from an investor in 
a futures trade to its broker not to sell below a certain price in order 
to hedge against losses—and the futures price fell 108 trading 
points.109 Seconds later, as if anticipating the drop, the same broker 
placed a string of buy orders and the price spiked upward roughly 
260 points as other investors piled on.110 When the dust settled one 
hundred seconds later, 307 investors had made PLN 5.4 million, 
777 investors had lost PLN 5.4 million, and the Virgin Islands 
investor netted PLN 2.6 million.111 One reporter noted that some 
individual investors lost all of the money in their margin accounts, 
forcing them to leave the exchange altogether.112 Investors began to 
refer to the incident as the WSE’s “notorious 100 seconds.”113 
Commentators dubbed the matter one of the greatest scandals in 
WSE history,114 and they expressed fears about what such 
manipulation could mean for overall investment: 
 
 
 
106 Krawczyk, supra note 12.  
107 See id.; see also Marcin Dziadkowiak, Komentarz redakcyjny, Środa na 
GPW czyli 2,5 mln zł do wzięcia [Editorial, Wednesday on the WSE, or PLN 2.5 
Million for the Taking], BANKIER.PL, Feb. 4, 2004, available at http://bankier.pl/ 
wiadomosci/print.html?article_id=1013441; Miłosz Węglewski, 100 sekund 
szaleństwa na kontraktach terminowych [100 Seconds of Insanity on the Futures 
Exchange], GAZETA WYBORCZA, Feb. 5, 2004, available at http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/ 
metroon/1,0,1900550.html.  
108 See Dziadkowiak, supra note 107; Węglewski, supra note 107.  
109 See id.; Krawczyk, supra note 12.  
110 See Dziadkowiak, supra note 107. 
111 See Krawczyk, supra note 12.  
112 See Węglewski, supra note 107. 
113 Paweł Pełc, Czy OFE powinny mieć możliwość inwestycji w intrumenty 
pochodne? [Should Open Pension Funds Be Able to Invest in Derivatives?], 
BANKIER.PL, Aug. 17, 2004, available at http://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosci/print. 
html?article_id=1191058.  
114 See Węglewski, supra note 107; 100 sekund skandalu na GPW—cd. [100 
Seconds of Scandal on the WSE—Continued], GAZETA WYBORCZA, Mar. 19, 2004 
[hereinafter 100 Seconds of Scandal], available at http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/metroon/ 
1,0,1977788.html. 
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If investors do not have equal market opportunity 
and at any moment may get “worked over” for big 
money, as if they were facing a street hoodlum, no 
investor will want to “play” in such a market—they 
will either take their game somewhere else or stop 
investing. The Polish exchange could, in short 
order, become a worthless market, where only a 
handful of investors along with some pension and 
investment funds will come to play. Neither the 
WSE nor the KPWiG [Polish Securities and 
Exchange Commission (the Polish SEC)] likely 
wants such a situation.115  
 
On one hand, the scandal appeared to be classic manipulation 
that could occur in any market with inefficiencies. The manipulator 
establishes a price trend and then profits by trading against it.116 On 
the other hand, the debacle had everything to do with the special 
nature of futures and their associated stop-loss orders. “Stop-order 
gunning” is the term investors use to describe the tactic of 
triggering multiple stop orders at once in order to manipulate 
prices. The manipulator in this case timed the effects of his gunning 
perfectly.117 Various sources in the Polish press suggest that the 
incident was not an isolated instance of stop-order gunning—at 
least three other similar incidents occurred.118 
 
 
 
115 See 100 Seconds of Scandal, supra note 114.  
116 Mahoney, supra note 99, at 148 (citing Robert Jarrow’s market-manipulation 
model). 
117 See, e.g., Wendy Collins Perdue, Manipulation of the Futures Markets: 
Redefining the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 345, 398–99 (1987); Jerry W. Markham, 
Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices: The Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON 
REG. 281, at 295–96 n. 75 (1991).  
118 See Dziadkowiak, supra note 107 (noting that “something similar has already 
occurred twice but was taken for error of the broker placing the order”); Paweł 
Rejczak, Podsumowanie wyników systemu inwestycyjnego dla rynku futures po I 
półroczu 2004 [A Summary of Investment Results for the Futures Market after the 
First Half of 2004], EUROBANKIER.PL, Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://euro.bankier. 
pl/edu/multiarticle.html?article_id=1187009&position=1 (noting that in addition to the 
Feb. 4 incident, a similar action had occurred on Jan. 8); Paweł Rejczak, Futures: 
Nerwowe wahania na niższym poziomie [Futures: Nervous Variance at a Lower 
Level], BANKIER.PL, Mar. 19, 2004, available at http://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosci/ 
print.html?article_id=1069043 (noting that a slew of simultaneous stop orders could 
have been the result of manipulation).  
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2. Official reactions to the scandal and legislative development 
under Polish law 
 
Two minutes after the 100-second incident came to a close, the 
Polish SEC had already begun to scrutinize all of the involved 
transactions—who had gained and who had lost.119 In a press 
conference, Jacek Socha, chairman of the Polish SEC, clarified that 
their initial efforts concentrated on discovering whether the 
incident had occurred pursuant to broker error or actual fraud.120 
One week later, Socha declared: “There can be no doubt that the 
events of last Wednesday were of a criminal character.”121  
On the Thursday following the incident, the Polish SEC had 
informed both the General Inspector of Financial Information and 
the Internal Security Agency of wrongdoing. The general inspector 
froze the order-placing investor’s Polish bank accounts.122 Polish 
SEC investigation further revealed that the person who actually 
placed the orders was not an authorized broker.123 The broker, from 
the Polish brokerage house PKO BP, had given his access code to 
an office friend—in contravention of Polish securities regulation—
who then placed the orders. The Polish SEC suspended the broker 
for six months, and PKO BP moved quickly to dismiss both the 
broker and his colleague.124  
By March 19, at least ninety investors had turned to the 
Individual Investors Association for help in seeking restitution.125 
PKO BP offered to allow all injured investors to set up brokerage 
accounts on preferential terms, a move that the Association deemed 
an insult.126 The Association and its investors preferred initiating a 
civil action against PKO BP, but bemoaned lack of clarity in the 
 
 
119 Andrzej Stec, 100-sekundowy szwindel na giełdzie [100-Second Swindle on 
the Exchange], GAZETA WYBORCZA, Feb. 10, 2004 [hereinafter 100-Second Swindle on 
the Exchange], available at http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/metroon/1,0,1907909.html?ustaw 
Energis=1. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id.  
123 Id.  
124 Id.  
125 Id. The Individual Investors Association is a Polish nonprofit group based in 
Wrocław, Poland, the mission of which is to educate individual investors and lobby 
for investment-realated best practices. See O Stowarzyszeniu [About the Association], 
http://www.sii.org.pl/stow_ostow.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).  
126 Id.  
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Polish statutory scheme and lack of desire on the part of 
prosecutors to bring criminal charges:  
 
Documenting a definition of manipulation is 
fundamentally important. In the [Warsaw] 
prosecutor’s office, the head of the division for 
crimes in the capital markets represented the train 
of thought shared by judges and, lamentably, 
prosecutors. The thrust seems to be that if there is 
no concrete provision spelling out what constitutes 
manipulation, then manipulation never occurred. 
This rigid, legalistic approach has, according to 
judicial statistics, prevented any change in this area 
for years.127 
 
The opaque statute to which the Association referred was 
Poland’s 1997 Law on the Public Trade of Securities.128 Following 
passage of the 1997 law—and as Poland began to prepare for E.U. 
accession—Polish legislators worked to amend the statute so that it 
would reflect E.U. standards. As amended on December 8, 2000, 
the statute included “crimes in opposition to the public exchange of 
securities” and provided public prosecutors with the power, in 
accordance with existing law, to bring charges where such crimes 
occurred.129 Although Polish lawmakers clearly included exchange-
traded derivatives, nowhere did their amendment describe the 
various forms that criminal securities violations might take.130 
Instead, the statute simply acknowledged the existence of such 
crimes and empowered prosecutors to act as they saw fit.  
 
 
127 Stowarzyszenie Inwestorów Indywidualnych [Individual Investors Ass’n], 4 
lutego na rynku futures—ciąg dalszy nastąpi [4 Feb. on the Futures Exchange—To Be 
Continued], ONET.PL (Mar. 25, 2004), available at http://gielda.onet.pl/0,1156246, 
komentarze.html. 
128 Ustawa z dnia 21 sierpnia 1997 r. Prawo o publicznym obrocie papierami 
wartościowymi [Law of 27 Sept. 1997, Statute on the Public Trade of Securities] 
(Dz.U. z 1997 r. Nr 118 poz. 754) [hereinafter Polish Securities Law]. 
129 Ustawa z dnia 8 grudnia 2000 r. o zmianie ustawy—Prawo o publicznym 
obrocie papierami wartościowymi—w związku z dostosowaniem do Prawa Unii 
Europejskiej [Law of 8 Dec. 2000 Amending the Law—Statute on the Public Trade of 
Securities—in Connection with Conforming to the Law of the European Union] art. 
4(10) (Dz.U. z 2000 r. Nr 122 poz. 1315), at 18 [hereinafter 2000 Amendments]. 
130 See Polish Securities Law, supra note 128, art. 3(3). The 1997 statute 
provided that “securities” included “property rights whose price either directly or 
indirectly depends on the price of [stocks and bonds] (derivative rights).” Id.  
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Although fully able to act under the securities law amendments 
of 2000, Warsaw prosecutors initially did nothing to prosecute the 
February 4 manipulation.131 In contrast to this law enforcement 
inertia, the Polish Sejm (parliament) approved and published 
further amendments to the 1997 securities law on March 12, 
2004.132 In introducing the amendments, Polish legislators noted: 
“This law accomplishes, in the scope of its regulation, 
incorporation of...[E.U.] directive 2003/6...[in the matter of] market 
manipulation.”133 Article 97 of the updated statute explicitly 
addressed market manipulation, adopting almost word-for-word the 
broad-brush definition of manipulation suggested by the E.U. in its 
Directive: 
 
(1) Manipulation of financial instruments, hereafter 
“manipulation,” is prohibited. (2) Manipulation 
shall be...placing orders, entering into transactions 
or undertaking other actions which give, or are 
likely to give, false signals as to the demand for, 
supply of, or price of financial instruments unless 
the reasons for entering into such actions were 
legitimate, and such orders, transactions, or other 
actions did not violate accepted market practices on 
the regulated market concerned.134  
 
As in the E.U. directive, Polish legislators chose not to 
prescriptively define manipulation, opting instead to outline general 
conduct in a way that gives law enforcement agencies latitude in 
pursuing criminal action. 
Further, Polish legislators stiffened the proposed penalty for 
perpetrating market manipulation. In addition to the administrative 
sanctions that the E.U. suggested in Directive 2003/6, which gives 
the Polish SEC power to impose fines, the Polish government 
reserved the right to fine offenders up to PLN 5 million or impose a 
prison sentence of up to five years or both.135 All of the March 12 
 
 
131 Stowarzyszenie Inwestorów Indiwidualnych, supra note 127. 
132 Ustawa z dnia 12 marca 2004 r. o zmianie ustawy—Prawo o publicznym 
obrocie papierami wartościowymi oraz o zmianie innych ustaw [Law of 12 Mar. 2004 
Amending the Statute on the Public Trade of Securities and Other Statutes] (Dz.U. z 
2004 r. Nr 64 poz. 594).  
133 Id. at 1, n. 1.  
134 Id. art. 97, at 75.  
135 Id. art. 177, at 117.  
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amendments to the Polish securities statute took effect on May 1, 
2004, the day that Poland entered the E.U.136 
By April 2004, indications began to appear that the malefactors 
of February 4 might meet justice after all. Although the Internal 
Security Agency (ISA) had yet to pin down the identity of the 
investor behind the “100 second” manipulation, the Warsaw 
prosecutor used ISA agents to apprehend the PKO BP broker and 
his order-placing accomplice on April 5.137 The prosecutor 
subjected both individuals to constant supervision and prohibited 
them from leaving the country.138 In September, a report arose 
suggesting that the Warsaw prosecutor would press charges against 
both parties.139 
However, charges never arose. One year after the scandal took 
place, on February 4, 2005, Andrzej Stec wrote for the Gazeta 
Wyborcza, Poland’s largest newspaper: 
 
It initially seemed that justice would be satisfied. 
The [Polish SEC] gauged the accounts of the secret 
investor and its agent in rapid tempo.... [Now] 
however, injured investors possess less and less 
hope that the guilty will meet punishment. As of 
today, no charges have arisen, the accounts of the 
investor were unblocked, and the money 
disappeared—probably to Switzerland.140  
 
The Warsaw prosecutor’s reply to such concerns was twofold. 
Fundamentally, the reply claimed securities cases simply require a 
long time to prepare and execute. Moreover, it underscored the fact 
that its division for prosecuting securities crimes had only six 
attorneys, each of whom had an average of ten active Polish SEC–
 
 
136 Id. at 118.  
137 Andrzej Stec, 100 sekund skandalu—dwóch zatrzymanych [100 Second 
Scandal—Two Apprehended], GAZETA WYBORCZA, Apr. 6, 2004, available at 
http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/metroon/1,0,2009248.html. 
138 Id.  
139 Michał Śliwiński, Afera z 4 lutego—sprawcy nieznani [The February 4 
Scandal—Perpetrators Unknown], INTERIA.PL, Sept. 23, 2004, available at 
http://mojeinwestycje.interia.pl/news?inf=545602. 
140 Andrzej Stec, 100 sekund rok później [100 Seconds a Year Later], GAZETA 
WYBORCZA, Feb. 4, 2005 [hereinafter 100 Seconds a Year Later], available at 
http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/metroon/1,0,2528174. html.  
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referred cases.141 The prosecutor claimed charges could be filed as 
soon as May 2005, however, charges have yet to arise.142  
It remains unclear why the WSE did not simply suspend trading 
when prices began to drop on February 4, 2004. Section 142 of the 
exchange’s regulations provides that the WSE will suspend trading 
whenever the price of a traded security varies, at most, more than ± 
ten percent from the normal trading price.143 Traders refer to such 
provisions for automatic suspension as “circuit breakers.”144 One 
analyst noted that the execution of the “100 second” trade took 
place in such a manner that neither the initial dip nor the resulting 
spike in trading prices tripped the WSE circuit breakers (although 
both came quite close).145 As a result, the WSE modified the 
futures-trading variance that it would tolerate before suspending 
trade to five percent instead of ten percent.146 
 
3. Assessment and suggestions 
 
The solution to manipulation of the Polish futures exchange and 
other comparably sized exchanges is clear-cut: increase liquidity 
and market capitalization. As trade volume and market 
transparency increase, other investors price out would-be 
manipulators and thus destroy their ability to manipulate the 
market. The solution, however, poses a paradox. For manipulation 
to cease, Poland must have a thicker market; but market 
manipulation undermines the necessary investor confidence needed 
to induce large scale spending.  
Technical fixes, such as the WSE circuit breaker modification, 
seem unlikely to resolve the problem. Many commentators have 
observed that circuit breakers often work to impede normal 
trading.147 Economist Merton Miller remarked that, by their design, 
circuit breakers “shut down the markets and stop business from 
 
 
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
143 Regulamin Giełdy Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie S.A. [Reg. of the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange] § 142(1)–(5) (Feb. 24, 2004).  
144 See, e.g., Inter-exchange Procedures in Volatile Markets for Second Quarter 
2005, REG. CIRCULAR (Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Chicago, Ill.), Apr. 22, 2005, at 1; 
Jerry W. Markham, Federal Regulation of Margin in the Commodity Futures 
Industry—History and Theory, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 59, at 139 n.549 (Spring 1991).  
145 See Dziadkowiak, supra note 107. 
146 Id.  
147 See, e.g., Markham, supra note 144; Greg Burns, Commentary, Circuit 
Breakers Do More Harm Than Good, BUS. WK., Aug. 5, 1996, at 72. 
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being done.”148 Miller’s comment seems all the more pertinent for 
markets like Poland where trading is naturally more volatile and 
thus more likely to trip circuit breakers and suspend trading. 
Proponents of circuit breakers argue that allowing investors to 
digest needed information and make rational decisions when 
trading varies significantly from normal volumes mitigates the 
inconvenience caused by such technical fixes. However, instances 
such as the “100 second” scandal prove otherwise. Providing only a 
false sense of security, circuit breakers and other technical 
remedies simply add an extra element of contest for manipulators 
who wish to abuse the market.149  
Merely providing a definition of manipulation that covers most 
or all of the conduct that regulators deem unlawful will not solve 
the paradox. Jerry Markham, former chief counsel for the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), remarked: “[I]t 
may be appropriate to maintain a residual broad prohibition against 
manipulation that will sweep up unusual or novel manipulation 
techniques....[However,] a completely different regulatory approach 
is needed to attack the concerns raised by manipulation.”150  
The “completely different approach” that Markham 
advocated—in the context of discussing apparent CFTC failure to 
stifle manipulation in U.S. commodity futures trading—centered on 
creation of a “fair and orderly market” as opposed to a laissez-faire 
system of trading.151 
 
The concept of a fair and orderly market would lead 
to an overall approach of prevention, intervention 
and prosecution....The purpose of maintaining an 
orderly market is to assure that prices reflect actual 
conditions and are not the result of disruptive 
trading by powerful market forces that have the 
wherewithal to unduly affect prices. The 
requirement of a fair and orderly market reflects a 
 
 
148 Burns, supra note 147. 
149 See, e.g., Christopher J. Mailander, Financial Innovation, Domestic 
Regulation and the International Marketplace: Lessons on Meeting Globalization’s 
Challenge Drawn from the International Bond Market, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & 
ECON. 341, 385 n.297 (1997/1998) (citing an OECD study in which it was found that 
“circuit breakers…have not proved effective in reducing volatility due to the market’s 
ability to circumvent such restrictions”). 
150 Markham, supra note 117, at 361.  
151 Id. 
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social judgment that large traders should not be 
permitted to abuse these markets by causing 
disruptions affecting consumers and the economy in 
general....All of these efforts must be coupled with 
an effective program of prosecution. This program 
must provide for both criminal and civil 
penalties.152 
 
Markham’s “different approach” seems well suited to remedy the 
Polish paradox. Due to the relatively fragile state of this market, the 
Polish futures exchange officials must regulate in a way that will 
bolster investor confidence. Confidence will follow in the wake of 
regulation and enforcement that reflect investor sentiment that 
“large traders should not be permitted” to abuse and disrupt futures 
trading. 
Concerned less with laissez-faire and more with boosting 
investor confidence, authorities of the Polish securities commission 
and the Warsaw exchange have already worked hard to implement 
two of the three “Markham Approach” criteria—prevention and 
intervention. Evidence suggests that the Polish SEC and WSE have 
tried to prevent market manipulation. One such prophylactic, 
though largely ineffective method, is the imposition of circuit 
breakers that the WSE has put in place. Further, the Polish SEC has 
observers who actively monitor the price and volume of trades on 
the futures exchange, as evidenced by the commission employees 
who examined the “100 second” trades only moments after they 
took place.153 Although one could argue that it acted too slowly, the 
Polish SEC did intervene by freezing the investor’s accounts, 
suspending the involved brokers, and informing the prosecutor’s 
office. In an attempt at effective intervention, each year the Polish 
SEC refers dozens of cases to the Prosecutor’s office.154 
Unfortunately, referral is often where the trail ends.  
In the decade from 1994 to 2004, the Warsaw prosecutor’s 
office pressed charges in only twenty-three percent of the cases 
referred by the Polish SEC—an annual average of nine 
prosecutions for every thirty-seven referrals.155 Presumably, the 
ratio of convictions to referred cases is much lower. Herein lies the 
 
 
152 Id. at 363–64, 374. 
153 100-Second Swindle on the Exchange, supra note 119. 
154 100 Seconds a Year Later, supra note 140. 
155 Id. Averages are derived on calculations of the author based on given figures.  
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failure of Poland’s futures exchange to reflect the ideal of a “fair 
and orderly market.” The securities commission and the exchange 
are limited in their efforts to prevent and intervene when no 
manipulator faces the prospect of effective and conclusive 
prosecution. Markham stresses that effective regulation of 
manipulation in the futures context must include criminal 
prosecution that is concentrated (i.e., “sufficiently pointed in 
attacking particular practices”), quick, and efficient.156 
The March 12 amendments to Poland’s securities law allow for 
“concentrated” criminal prosecution because they specify practices 
that prosecutors can identify and pursue. Lawmakers can give a 
working definition of manipulation that facilitates concentrated 
prosecution; however, quick and efficient prosecution cannot be 
legislated. Complicating quick and efficient prosecution of the “100 
second” offenders is the fact that prosecutors cannot retroactively 
apply a March 2004 statute to conduct that occurred in February 
2004. This objection to retroactive application, however, poses no 
real practical concern since prosecutors were and remain free to use 
the securities law as it existed in 2000 to prosecute “crimes in 
opposition to the public exchange of securities.”157 Working with 
such broad statutory language, prosecutors have latitude to single 
out the criminals of February 4 and impose criminal sanctions. 
Beyond the “100 second incident,” the Warsaw prosecutor’s 
office must take an affirmative role in assisting the Polish SEC and 
the WSE in their efforts to regulate the Polish futures market. One 
step that the prosecutor’s office might take would be to increase the 
number of personnel employed to work on securities related crimes. 
Understaffing in the securities arena, however, seems more of a 
pretext than an actual impediment. Six prosecutors might not be 
able to successfully prosecute thirty-seven cases annually, but one 
presumes that nine cases a year—one-and-a-half actions per 
prosecutor—is low.158 
The dismal ratio of prosecutions to filed charges strongly 
suggests that lack of training and motivation lie at the heart of the 
problem. Raising the number of prosecutors might help, but 
Warsaw prosecutors must likewise seek E.U. funding and guidance 
in an effort to train prosecutors to take more effective legal action 
against instances of manipulation. Newly enacted E.U. provisions 
 
 
156 Markham, supra note 117, at 374. 
157 2000 Amendments, supra note 129. 
158 100 Seconds a Year Later, supra note 140. 
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can and should be a call to action for law enforcers in Poland and 
other new member states. Where clearly defined national norms did 
not exist previously, E.U. guidance has filled the void. Although 
European regulators seek implementation of post-FSAP measures, 
the reaction of Polish prosecutors to the February 4 scandal after 
implementation of Directive 2003/6 shows that local regulators 
have yet to fully assume the challenge. As a result, one cannot yet 
gauge whether administrative and criminal sanctions at the local 
level will achieve “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” 
outcomes.159  
 
C. Legal Risk in the Polish OTC Derivatives Market: The Credit 
Support Annex and Close-out Netting 
 
Poland is largely a jurisdiction where the law permits close-out 
netting.160 In an opinion commissioned by ISDA members, the 
Warsaw office of Allen & Overy comments generally that close-out 
netting “would be enforceable under Polish law in the event of 
voluntary or involuntary winding up proceedings in respect of a 
Polish entity.”161 However, this generally favorable situation can be 
complicated when the parties enter into a Credit Support Annex 
(CSA) under the ISDA Master Agreement.  
The CSA under an ISDA Master Agreement serves essentially 
the same function as a mandated margin account in the exchange-
traded context. The CSA allows one or both parties to pledge 
collateral based on the value at risk in a given transaction.162 As 
part of the ISDA Master Agreement’s “single agreement” 
framework, the CSA is intended to be netted with and rolled into 
the calculation of all other close-out payments when one party 
defaults or becomes insolvent.163 The Polish Bankruptcy Law of 
2003 prevents this from happening when the ISDA Master 
 
 
159 Parliament and Council Directive 2003/6/EC, supra note 51. 
160 Memorandum of Law from Allen & Overy (Warsaw) for the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association on Enforceability Under Polish Law of Close-out 
Netting of Privately Negotiated Derivatives Transactions Under the 1992 ISDA 
Master Agreement and the 2002 ISDA Master Agreement (Feb. 9, 2004) [hereinafter 
Polish Netting Memorandum] (on file with author).  
161 Id. at 6. 
162 INT’L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N, USER’S GUIDE TO THE ISDA CREDIT 
SUPPORT DOCUMENTS UNDER ENGLISH LAW 2 (1995). The workings of the CSA under 
New York law are essentially similar.  
163 Id. at 5; 2002 MASTER AGREEMENT, supra note 36, at 11. 
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Agreement is subject to Polish law, making the CSA amount a sum 
that could potentially be cherry picked by a Polish bankruptcy 
administrator.164 
The Polish Netting Opinion explains that “[t]ermination 
provisions of the Master Agreement [including close-out netting] 
may not apply to any transactions that do not qualify as ‘term 
financial transactions’ under Article 85.3 of the [Polish] 
Bankruptcy Law.”165 In turn, Article 85.2 of the Polish Bankruptcy 
Law defines term financial transactions as transactions “with a 
specified price, quotation, interest rate or index, and in particular 
the acquisition of funds, securities…entered into for settlement on a 
specified date or for a specified period of time, on the market 
place.”166 The CSA falls outside of the sphere of transactions 
qualifying for close-out netting under Polish law.  
This legislative bind could matter in the following situation. 
Suppose that two parties, a Polish bank and a Polish oil company, 
have many open derivatives trades under an ISDA Master 
Agreement governed by Polish law. They enter into a large interest 
rate swap to hedge the oil company’s exposure to one of its 
creditors. Given the size and significance of the swap, the parties 
decide to enter into a CSA in relation to the swap so that each will 
be able to pledge funds to cover any open position. As time 
progresses, the swap moves in the oil company’s favor and the bank 
sets aside money in an escrow fund established under the CSA. The 
oil company then declares bankruptcy and soon after tries to apply 
close-out netting. The calculation netting all open trades 
outstanding between the bank and the oil company—including the 
CSA amount—produces a net sum owed to the bank. However, 
since investors cannot add the CSA to the netting equation under 
the Polish Bankruptcy Law, the amount remains outstanding in the 
oil company’s favor and the Polish bankruptcy administrator is free 
to claim the amount for the bankrupt estate.  
One solution to this problem might simply be for the parties to 
make their agreement subject to a jurisdiction where this problem 
does not arise. However, due to raised transaction and potential 
dispute costs, many parties may wish to continue trading under 
Polish law. In order to make the regime for close-out netting more 
 
 
164 Polish Netting Memorandum, supra note 160, at 5, 7; Polish Bankruptcy 
Law, supra note 100, at 132.   
165 Polish Netting Memorandum, supra note 160, at 7. 
166 Id. at 5, 7; Polish Bankruptcy Law, supra note 100, at 132. 
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equitable for both parties, Polish legislators must update the 
Bankruptcy Statute to allow agreements such as the CSA to fall 
within the purview of transactions in which netting is permissible in 
bankruptcy. Doing so would move the Polish market closer to the 
ideal of the E.U. as expressed in its Insolvency Regulation, where 
legislators sought to preserve the rights of creditors to set-off their 
claims against the claims of parties in bankruptcy.167 
 
D. Derivatives Accounting Standards and the Polish OTC Market 
 
1. The quest to smooth earnings 
 
Recent U.S. headliners AIG and Fannie Mae demonstrate a 
familiar story about financial managers who seek to smooth 
earnings and hide financial risk.168 Other recent literature in both 
law and finance sets forth the contours as follows.169 In the late 
1980s, executive salaries in publicly traded companies increasingly 
began to depend on equity compensation.170 Managers whose salary 
was part equity had special incentive to please the market and 
increase share price. A crucial aspect of pleasing the market 
centered on meeting the projections of analysts who tell the market 
what to expect from given companies. The price for failing to meet 
 
 
167 See Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 51. 
168 See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald & Jenny Anderson, How a Titan of Insurance Ran 
Afoul of the Government, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2005, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/04/business/04aig.html (noting that the SEC began 
its investigation upon seeing an A.I.G. brochure advertising how a “product deemed 
‘loss mitigation insurance’ could be used by public companies to present smooth 
earnings performance to investors, even amid losses”); School for Scandal: Dangers 
of the US Mortgage Giant’s Special Status, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2004, at 16 (noting 
that “the result of Fannie’s hedge accounting exercise was to smooth earnings by 
neutralising the impact of marking derivatives to market”).  
169 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and 
Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004); Adriaen M. Morse, 
Jr., Breaking the Circle: The Problem of Independent Directors Policing Public 
Company Financial Disclosure Under the SEC’s New Rules Governing Public 
Company Audit Committees, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 673, at 674 (2004); 
Arthur Levitt, Chairman, S.E.C., Remarks at the NYU Center for Law and Business, 
The “Numbers Game,” (Sept. 28, 1998), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt. 
170 See Coffee, supra note 169, at 274–75; see also Tom Nohel & Steven Todd, 
Compensation for Managers with Career Concerns: The Role of Stock Options in 
Optimal Contracts, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 229 (2005).  
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analyst expectations—even slightly—is investor stock-dumping.171 
Thus, managers strove to either hit analyst forecasts or exceed them 
to the extent possible. Commenting on the tendency for investment 
banks to override common business sense, former SEC chairman 
Arthur Leavitt said: “Too many corporate managers, auditors, and 
analysts are participants in a game of nods and winks. In the zeal to 
satisfy consensus earnings estimates and project a smooth earnings 
path, wishful thinking may be winning the day over faithful 
representation.”172 
Corporate managers have repeatedly played this game in their 
treatment of derivative financial instruments. To smooth earnings, 
financial managers can and do try to manipulate accounting rules in 
deciding when and how to recognize a gain or loss on a derivative 
contract.173 This problem is not unique to American shores as the 
Financial Times reports similar problems in Europe:  
 
Managements—at French banks, for instance—are 
reluctant to give up techniques [in the treatment of 
derivatives] that help them “smooth” earnings from 
one year to another. Their assumption is that users 
of accounts prefer smoothed outcomes.… As for 
smoothing the accounts, that was one of the motives 
that led Fannie Mae, the U.S. mortgage finance 
provider, allegedly to flout FAS 133, the U.S. 
equivalent of IAS 39. According to Fannie’s 
regulator, smoothing became manipulation of 
earnings—to which executive bonuses were 
related.174  
 
The implicit lesson for regulators is that wherever fluid capital 
markets, analyst projections, equity driven management, and 
 
 
171 See Coffee, supra note 169, at 277.  
172 Levitt, supra note 169. 
173 See School for Scandal, supra note 168 (noting that Fannie Mae 
inappropriately applied hedge accounting to some of its derivatives contracts in 
contravention of FAS 133); Elizabeth MacDonald, Kicking Fannie, FORBES, Mar. 14, 
2005, at 110 (noting that Fannie Mae “incorrectly…smoothed out earnings by 
temporarily ignoring the day-to-day fluctuations in the value of the derivative 
contracts it uses to hedge interest rate risks”); see also Monica S. Tew, Notes & 
Comments, The Dark Side of Derivatives: A Book Note on Infectious Greed: How 
Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets by Frank Partnoy, 8 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 289 (2004) (commenting on improper accounting for derivatives by Enron). 
174 Fuller, supra note 92. 
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derivatives converge—a convergence that seems to be materializing 
in Poland—management might feel pressured to manipulate 
earnings and OTC derivatives could be one tool utilized in the 
effort to do so.  
This pressure to manipulate earnings is precisely why IAS 39 
requires firms to place derivatives on the balance sheet at fair value 
as an asset or a liability. When regulations require companies to 
make full disclosure they have less ability to hide risk (assuming no 
foul play). However, the European Commission’s IAS 39 carve-out 
compromises this objective. Where American firms must overtly 
flout accounting standards to achieve artificially smoothed 
outcomes, firms in the E.U. need only exploit a prepackaged carve-
out, giving reason to wonder whether abuse of the provision could 
occur in the Polish market.  
 
2. The Polish market and the possibility of carve-out exploitation 
 
OTC derivatives–related developments in Poland merit special 
attention for a number of reasons. As discussed in the introduction, 
Polish OTC derivatives trading has consistently risen since 1995.175 
In 2004, Poland’s average daily turnover in reported OTC 
derivatives stood at US$6 billion, more than the Czech Republic 
and Hungary combined. Citing just one example, PKN Orlen—
Poland’s largest petrochemical company and the largest company 
listed on the WSE—boosted the fair-value amount of its derivatives 
by 387% from PLN 23 million to PLN 89 million in the one year 
period from 2002 to 2003.176 
A large portion of Poland’s everyday OTC trading volume 
passes through Poland’s biggest banks. The Bank for International 
 
 
175 BIS Derivatives Survey 2004, supra note 11, at 19; BIS Derivatives Survey 
1998, supra note 11, at 19.  
176 PKN ORLEN, 2003 RAPORT ROCZNY [ANNUAL REPORT] 138 (2004). Orlen, 
like all public companies in Poland, prepares its financial statements according to the 
IASB International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Under IFRS, fair value is 
“the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled, between 
knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction.” INT’L FIN. REPORTING 
STANDARDS, supra note 83, at 39-15. In other words, the growth in PKN’s derivatives 
use does not merely represent a growth in the notional amount of the derivatives that it 
uses, but a growth in the so-called “value at risk.” This fair-value, value-at-risk 
amount represents PKN’s actual exposure. In U.S. dollars, the cited figures represent 
growth from about $7 million to about $25 million. 
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Settlements (BIS) provides the following breakdowns for OTC 
trading in Poland:177 
 
OTC FOREIGN EXCHANGE DERIVATIVES TURNOVER 
BY COUNTERPARTY IN APRIL 2004 
NET TURNOVER 
POLAND DAILY AVERAGES 
(IN MILLIONS USD) 
With Reporting Local Dealers 337 
With Reporting Dealers Abroad 2783 
With Other Financial Institutions 1095 
With Nonfinancial Customers 389 
Total 4604 
Gross Turnover 4941 
 
 
 
OTC FOREIGN EXCHANGE DERIVATIVES TURNOVER 
BY COUNTERPARTY IN APRIL 2004 
Fig. 2 (created by the author on the basis of BIS figures) 
 
 
177 BIS Derivatives Survey 2004, supra note 11. 
With Financial Institutions 
24%
With Non-Financial 
Customers | 8%
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OTC SINGLE CURRENCY INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES TURNOVER 
BY COUNTERPARTY IN APRIL 2004 
NET TURNOVER 
POLAND DAILY AVERAGES 
 (IN MILLIONS USD) 
With Reporting Local Dealers 270 
With Reporting Dealers Abroad 501 
With Other Financial Institutions 172 
With Nonfinancial Customers 15 
Total 958 
Gross Turnover 1228 
 
 
OTC SINGLE CURRENCY INTEREST RATE DERIVATIVES TURNOVER 
BY COUNTERPARTY IN APRIL 2004 
Fig. 3 (created by the author on the basis of BIS figures) 
 
 
 
With Reporting Local Dealers
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BIS defines “reporting local dealers” and “other financial 
institutions” to include commercial and investment banks, 
insurance companies, brokerage houses, and so forth. In sum, 
Polish reporting local dealers and other financial institutions share 
approximately US$1.8 billion of daily OTC derivative turnover. 
Public trading of many, if not most, of these institutions occurs on 
the WSE, and all of these institutions are subject to IAS 39. 
On August 27, 2004, the Sejm amended its 1994 statute on 
accounting standards.178 Prior to the amendments, Polish banks and 
publicly traded companies had prepared financial statements 
according to Polish accounting standards. The 2004 amendments 
recognized that beginning January 1, 2005, publicly traded Polish 
companies and all Polish banks would prepare financial statements 
in accordance with international financial reporting standards and 
E.U. interpretations of those standards.179 Of course, part of the 
E.U. interpretation of IFRS includes Regulation 707/2004, which 
introduced the carve-out to IAS 39. As a result, Polish 
institutions—banks in particular—that use derivatives are free 
under Polish and E.U. law to exclude those derivatives from the 
balance sheet or to mark them at unfair values as long as such 
derivatives fit the categories specified in the carve-out. 
Another reason to look closely at the Polish market is that 
Polish companies are increasingly coming under the scrutiny of 
foreign investors and analysts. In March 2005, International 
Securities Finance reported: 
 
Morley has launched a Central European long/short 
fund to be wholly managed and invested in 
Poland....Commenting on the launch of the fund, 
Ian Ainscow, head of international business 
development at Morley Fund Management, said: 
“The EU accession earlier this year has resulted in 
increased investor interest in Central European 
economies….We have seen increased demand for 
 
 
178 Ustawa z dnia 29 września 1994 r. o rachunkowości [Statute of 29 Sept. 1994 
on Accounting], arts. 2(3), 45, 55 (Dz.U. z 2002 r. Nr 76 poz. 694), at 2, 46–47, 54; 
Ustawa z dnia 27 sierpnia 2004 r. o zmianie ustawy o rachunkowości oraz o zmianie 
ustawy o biegłych rewidentach i ich samorządzie [Statute of 27 Aug. 2004 Amending 
the Statute on Accounting and Amending the Statute on Auditors and Their Self-
Regulation], art. 1 (Dz.U z 2004 r. Nr 213 poz. 2155), at 1 [hereinafter Accounting 
Law Amendment]. 
179 See Accounting Law Amendment, supra note 178, art. 1, at 1–2. 
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alternative investment products and the launch of 
this fund offers new diversification possibilities to a 
range of sophisticated investors.”180 
 
Another such development was the announcement in February 
2005 that the WSE approved Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein 
(DrKW) as its first investment bank foreign member.181 As of April 
1, 2005, DrKW—one of Europe’s leading investment banks—has 
made available a slate of institutional investors who will provide 
Polish businesses well heeled purchasers for their public offerings. 
Matthias Rode, head of equity flow derivatives for DrKW in 
Frankfurt, commented: 
 
Since Poland’s accession to the EU, our 
institutional clients in Western Europe—including 
mutual and hedge funds—have shown a great 
interest in the Polish market and so we see 
significant growth potential for our new product. 
The Polish equity market is attractive to our clients 
because it has depth and maturity with a number of 
liquid stocks, good daily turnover and a well 
developed derivatives market.182  
 
As the eyes of foreign and local investors begin to focus on 
publicly traded Polish companies, those companies will 
increasingly feel the same pressure as their Western European and 
American counterparts to produce smooth outcomes. Strategic 
derivatives accounting, including the familiar game of winks and 
nods, might conceivably emerge in a market where managers face 
mounting pressure to meet analyst predictions, contemplate the 
prospect of personal gain (or the spectacle of personal loss), and 
evaluate the available means for achieving desired outcomes at low 
cost. To the extent that Polish publicly traded companies can 
exploit the carve-out in IAS 39, the Polish market might see 
debacles comparable to AIG and Fannie Mae.  
Gauging the scope of this risk is difficult. To do so would 
require examining both public and nonpublic financial data on 
 
 
180 Polish Market Proves a Draw, supra note 19. 
181 Press Release, Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, supra note 19; see also 
Polish Market Proves a Draw, supra note 19.  
182 Press Release, Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, supra note 19.  
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banks, publicly traded companies, and the projections of various 
investment banks and other analysts. Ideally, a significant 
correlation would exist between analyst projections, a company’s 
earnings, and the timing and manner with which a company or bank 
closes out its derivatives contracts. An undertaking of this scale is 
beyond the scope of the present paper. Instead, this work briefly 
examines one prominent Polish bank that is a WSE blue chip and 
assesses whether the bank’s situation allows it to exploit IAS 39 as 
understood in the light of Regulation 707/2004. 
 
3. Profile of a market participant: Pekao 
 
Poland’s largest commercial banks, which compose a large 
share of the WSE’s total market capitalization, are regular users of 
derivatives.183 Pekao is one such bank. Established in 1929 and 
currently the second largest bank traded on the WSE, Pekao is a 
strong performer.184 In 2004, its return on equity was 18.4%, and it 
consistently outperformed the WIG 20 by a significant margin.185 
Pekao merits attention due to a number of factors, including its 
prominence as a Polish market leader, its use of an equity driven 
management, and its use of derivatives. As many U.S. firms have 
begun to abandon options as a form of compensation,186 Pekao and 
other Polish firms have just begun instituting stock option plans.187 
In July 2003, Pekao approved “creation of a motivational program 
for managers of the Bank’s capital group, who are key to realizing 
the Bank’s strategy.”188 The Pekao program granted 14.1 million 
long term stock options to managers in a two step transaction.189 
Although option-based motivational schemes have some relevance 
 
 
183 See, e.g., PEKAO, 2004 RAPORT ROCZNY [ANNUAL REPORT] 109–10 (2005) 
(reporting PLN 551 million in total derivatives contracts); Kominek, supra note 14, at 
1028–29 (reporting that many of the largest members of the WSE are commercial 
banks).  
184 Bank Pekao S.A., http://www.gpw.com.pl/zrodla/gpw/zlote/pekao.html (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2006).  
185 Id.; http://www.gpw.com.pl/images/spolkigieldowe/wykresy_zlot/year/B_PE 
KAO.png. 
186 Louis Lavelle, Are Options Headed for Extinction?, BUS. WK., May 2, 2005, 
at 12. 
187 See e.g., PKN ORLEN, supra note 176, at 146 (indicating that in 2003, Orlen 
for the first time granted its officers 254,493 stock options, all of which were 
exercised within the year); PEKAO, supra note 183, at 116–17. 
188 PEKAO, supra note 183, at 116–17.  
189 Id.  
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in assessing whether a firm poses a risk of accounting malfeasance, 
such schemes are not necessary or sufficient conditions for such 
malfeasance.  
Whether or not a given firm has off-balance-sheet derivative 
positions is a more relevant factor in assessing such risk. In 2004, 
Pekao reported PLN 551 million of off-balance-sheet, OTC 
derivatives contracts, a sum equal to seven percent of its total assets 
of PLN 59 billion.190 In its financial statement notes, Pekao relates 
that this sum is comprised of interest-rate swaps as well as currency 
forwards and swaps.191 As an institution that prepares its statements 
according to IFRS, IAS 39, and Regulation 707/2004, Pekao should 
use these instruments in “hedging relationships where…the hedged 
item is a net position; or where the hedge covers interest risk in a 
held-to-maturity investment,” thus allowing the off-balance-sheet 
treatment.192  
Pekao’s stated intention in using all of its derivatives contracts 
is to “manage the risks related to standard operations.”193 Despite 
this legitimate purpose, derivatives contracts—measured at fair 
value—in an amount equal to seven percent of a company’s total 
assets are significant. The key question, therefore, is whether 
managers will be tempted to strategically close out derivatives 
contracts or mark them at other than fair value if it looks unlikely 
that the bank will hit the most recent earnings estimates. In a 
market with increasing scrutiny and competition where the means 
for earnings manipulation are available, regulators must pay close 
attention to the way that banks and other publicly traded entities 
account for their derivatives contracts.  
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
On balance, the FSAP successfully provided a workable plan 
for introducing wide scale financial reform in the E.U. A key part 
of this reform overhauled the E.U.’s statutory structure for the 
regulation of derivatives in four key categories: risk management, 
clearance and settlement, accounting standards, and market 
manipulation. As the attention of European and member state 
regulators shifts from legislative drafting to local implementation 
 
 
190 Id. at 109–10. 
191 Id. at 105–06, 109–10. 
192 Commission Regulation 707/2004, supra note 51, Annex ¶ 29. 
193 PEKAO, supra note 183, at 105. 
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and enforcement, the derivatives provisions relating to accounting 
standards and market manipulation are particularly important for 
Poland and its neighboring states who recently joined the E.U.  
Close-out netting poses a challenge for Polish legislators where 
parties utilize a Credit Support Annex under the ISDA Master 
Agreement. The regime allows bankruptcy administrators to 
inequitably claim amounts due under the Annex in situations where, 
in another jurisdiction, the amounts would belong to the non-
bankrupt party according to the close-out netting calculation. Polish 
legislators must update their regime to reflect the E.U. regime, 
which preserves the right of creditors to set off all claims owing 
against a debtor.  
The Polish securities commission and futures exchange 
regulators are attempting to prevent manipulation, and intervene 
when it occurs. However, the failure of Polish prosecutors to bring 
charges against manipulators has hindered efforts to establish a 
“fair and orderly” futures market. Polish regulators should train 
Polish prosecutors to prosecute the conduct specified in Directive 
2003/6 and the most recent amendment to the Polish securities law 
more effectively. 
Regarding accounting standards, the carve-out that the 
European Commission introduced into IAS 39 can potentially 
undermine the requirement that companies reflect all of their assets 
and liabilities at fair value. As a result, in Poland and other 
European member states where publicly traded entities have the 
ability and incentive to smooth earnings, regulators must pay close 
attention to the way such entities account for their derivatives 
contracts. Regulators will be able to circumvent the game of winks 
and nods by carefully implementing E.U. anti-manipulation 
standards and vigilantly watching the derivatives accounting habits 
of banks and other publicly traded companies.  
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